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Abstract
A long-term strategy based on existing technological, ecological, economical, and 
geopolitical realities is urgently needed to develop a sustainable energy economy, which
should be designed with adaptability to unpredicted changes in any of these aspects. 
While only a highly diverse energy portfolio and conservation can ultimately guarantee 
optimum sustainability, based on a comparison of current primary energy generation 
methods, it is argued that future energy strategy has to rely heavily on expanded coal 
and nuclear energy sectors. A comparison of relative potentials, merits and risks asso-
ciated with fossil-fuel, renewable, and nuclear technologies suggests that the balance of
technologies should be shifted in favor of new-generation, safe nuclear methods to pro-
duce electricity, while clean-coal plants should be assigned to transportation fuel. Novel
nuclear technologies exploit fission of uranium and thorium as primary energy sources
with fast-spectrum and transmutation (burner) reactors. A closed fuel cycle and waste 
transmutation resolve the strategic issues associated with nuclear power. Innovative 
reactor designs utilize spallation of heavy metals in subcritical accelerator driven systems
or molten-salt reactors. Importation and reconstruction of technical expertise already 
lost and aversion of further erosion are preconditions to any successful energy strategy. 
Research opportunities to perfect innovative nuclear, coal, and renewable energy tech-
nologies should be pursued.
Keywords: sustainable energy economy, clean coal and advanced nuclear energy systems
 
Introduction
As the Earth's population and its aspira-
tions for a healthier and more prosperous stan-
dard of living grow, requirements of conti-
nuous, clean and environmentally sustainable 
primary energy production increase dramatical-
ly. Typical estimates envision the global demand
to increase from 12 TW today, 85% of which is 
fossil-fueled, to more than 45TW by mid-
century. Earth’s dwindling energy resources and 
insufficient basic energy infrastructure give am-
ple reason to doubt that such enormous de-
mands could actually be satisfied. Increasing in-
ternational competition for access to energy re-
sources adds reason to be concerned about the 
degree to which goals of national energy inde-
pendence and security can be approached. Pro-
posed energy strategies lead to the conclusion 
that the production ideals stated above are vir-
tually unattainable. In particular, the U.S. frac-
tion (25%) of total world energy consumption 
has to decline significantly. Therefore, parallel 
strategic action is needed to achieve significant
reduction in energy demand, a much improved 
energy distribution infrastructure (grid), and 
new energy R&D. Within this framework, a sus-
tainable strategy for generating primary energy 
is crucial, one which
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has good prospects to satisfy a variable mix 
of energy demandsby flexible response;
 
enhances energy independence;
takes into account existing infrastructure 
and its evolutionary inertia;
is largely independent of future technolo-
gical breakthroughs; and
is acceptable to the public.
It follows from these principles that in the pa-
lette of energy technologies those primary 
energy resources should be developed with 
highest priority that
1. are domestically abundant and economi-
cally accessible with current technologies,
2. tie in with existing distribution networks,
3. satisfy a steady base load demand,
4. are safe to produce and use,
5. are adaptable to a variety of fuel demands,
6. minimize the release of pollutants.
The following outlines and puts in perspective 
aspects of a long-term strategy for securing a 
reliable primary energy economy, realizing
modern nuclear and “clean-coal” technologies, 
which appear to be the only serious contenders
for the task.
  
Task definition and background
The basic energy supply task faced by in-
dustrialized and developing nations alike is 
complicated by simultaneous calls for an overall 
limitation, and even a reduction, in the asso-
ciated output of “greenhouse gases” (GHG).
Anthropogenic greenhouse gases, most impor-
tantly carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), ni-
tric gases (NOx, x = 1, 2), and chlorofluorocar-
bons (CFC), but also water vapor (H2O), are sus-
pected to influence the global climate in an un-
desirable way, thereby harming the biosphere
and threatening specifically human civilizations. 
Additional complexity arises from the fact that
mobile and stationary energy consuming sec-
tors of most economies require different ap-
proaches in terms of primary and secondary 
energy carriers and distribution networks.
While stationary energy demands can, in prin-
ciple, be satisfied by electricity supplied by the 
grid, the prevalent transportation fleet largely 
requires fuel in convenient onboard packages, 
presently realized by liquid fuels with high 
energy (caloric) density. To maintain such com-
plexity under future variable external conditions 
requires a highly flexible domestic energy infra-
structure based on a diverse set of primary 
energy sources. In practice, this goal can be rea-
lized only in stages.
The public has been sensitized to aspects of 
energy scarcity and environmental problems by 
rising oil and gas prices, widely publicized sce-
narios of impending climatic changes, and evi-
dently insufficient urban air quality. But it has 
largely been left unaware of the technological 
boundary conditions imposed on a realistic, 
flexible and sustainable energy strategy and its
coupling to the existing economic infrastruc-
ture. 
Well publicized issues associated with fossil 
or nuclear fuel based energy alternatives in-
clude the limited availability of the primary fu-
els, the environmental impact and risks in min-
ing and transport, and other hazards associated 
with plant security and operations. Major objec-
tions to these technologies relate to the dispo-
sition of toxic and GHG waste produced by fossil 
fuel burners and of the long-lived radio-toxins 
generated by nuclear power plants. The media 
have played a pernicious role in social amplifica-
tion of some of these concerns, specifically con-
cerning radiation, supporting irrational atti-
tudes. The opposite is required, a sober look at 
the available alternatives.
A number of popular science book publica-
tions (e.g., Gore, 2006, Morris, 2006) as well as 
public initiatives and promotions leave the im-
pression that the looming energy/climate crisis 
is solvable by harnessing increasing amounts of
renewable hydroelectric, wind, solar, geother-
mal and biomass energy sources, which are said 
to be available, virtually free and ecologically 
benign. Supposedly, renewable energy technol-
ogies will be able to displace those based on 
fossil and nuclear fuels, which are deemed eco-
logically disastrous and therefore to be phased 
out.
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Discussion in the present article supports a
different and more realistic view promoted to 
some extent also by other studies of possible 
and desirable energy futures (Hoffert, 2002, 
Deutch, 2003, Romm, 2005). The aim of such 
studies is to assess and inform government 
energy policies in the U.S. and other industria-
lized countries around the world. There are 
several fundamental and practical reasons for 
insisting on energy Realpolitik, i.e., a responsi-
ble energy policy oriented at present reality, a 
goal of maximum flexibility and realistic short 
term extrapolations in feasibility.
On the fundamental level, it has been 
known since the latter half of the 20th century
that complex or “emerging,” strongly coupled,
multi-dimensional systems show a non-linear 
overall response to changes in certain variables, 
notably the so-called order parameters. Simple 
mathematical models illustrate (e.g., Mainzer, 
1997) how predictable (orderly) behavior ob-
served for certain domains of order parame-
ter(s) can suddenly switch to unpredictable 
(chaotic) dynamics, once parameters exceed 
certain domain boundaries. 
Even a minimalistic view has to admit that
the global climate and national (or global) eco-
nomics (Krugman, 1996, Schweitzer, 2002) be-
long to the category of complex systems capa-
ble of orderly and chaotic dynamics. Neither is 
understood in enough detail to allow accurate 
predictions to be made for their dynamical evo-
lution beyond the short term of, perhaps, a few 
years or a decade. On the other hand, plausible 
arguments have been made (IPCC, 2007) that 
anthropogenic actions can lead to a coupling of 
global climate and economy creating a super-
complex coupled system. Coupling factors in-
clude large-scale deforestation and atmospheric 
GHG emissions. In the interest of a better pre-
dictable (stable) global future, it then makes 
sense to strive to reduce anthropogenic coupl-
ing of climate and economic systems, i.e., to re-
duce the “carbon footprint” of the economy.
 
On the practical level, the success of past 
future forecasts does not instill great confi-
dence in present attempts at this art (Smil, 
2005). Based on these arguments and taking in-
to account the energy infrastructure already ex-
isting in industrial nations, a responsible energy 
strategy for the medium term of the next few 
a mix of existing
primary energy technologies, but further devel-
op and refine them. In this mix, efficient tech-
nologies based on domestically abundant fossil 
and nuclear fuels would necessarily dominate. 
Although the long-range potential of fusion 
energy technology is important for future gen-
erations, few energy experts expect that a prac-
tical fusion energy power plant can be commis-
sioned long before the end of this century 
(IFEO, 2004). In the interest of developing long-
term diversity, research and development of 
renewable fuel technologies derived from hy-
drodynamic (water) flow, solar radiation, wind, 
geothermal, or biomass, should be encouraged 
but not relied upon before proven maturity.
It is therefore safe to conclude that the lion 
share of any future growth in energy use will 
likely be covered by fossil fuel power plants 
burning coal and, to a decreasing extent, oil and 
natural gas (Deutch, 2003, Romm, 2005). Con-
ventional (fission) nuclear power contributing 
now 20% worldwide to electricity generation 
is seen (Deutch et al, 2003) to increase its share 
to at least 30% within the next 20 years, al-
though a share of 70-80% such as in France 
could be attained on a slightly longer time scale.
The energy intensive transportation sector 
shows trends of increasing electric/ liquid fuel 
hybridization and has generated renewed inter-
est in synthetic fuels. In principle, the expected 
increased demand for synthetic fuel could be 
satisfied employing available, albeit expensive 
and still relatively inefficient, industrial 
processes of coal gasification, pyrolysis, direct 
and indirect coal liquefaction (Probstein, 2006, 
Olah, 2006). Resulting shortages in coal based 
electricity would have to be mitigated by in-
creased electricity from nuclear power. This
likely scenario requires timely preparation, 
massive investments, as well as further R&D. 
Should renewable energy technologies mature 
and overcome their present technological bar-
riers, they could see an overall contribution to
the total energy economy higher than the few 
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per-cent now predicted (Romm, 2003, Eerkens, 
2006).
In advocating the development of a realistic 
and sustainable energy strategy for the indu-
strialized world and emerging economies, the 
present discussion will specifically elaborate ar-
guments for a priority deployment of nuclear 
power technologies. The merits of nuclear 
energy have been greatly and consistently un-
derappreciated, while its hazards have been 
overstated. Although the main alternative ener-
gy sources for the short and intermediate term 
remain coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy, 
the following includes also a brief account of 
environmental and technical issues related to 
renewable energy sources. It is merely intended 
to place energy alternatives in perspective, a 
task benefiting from several useful critical re-
views (Hoffert, 2002, Deutch, 2003, Ewing, 
2004). A thorough critical assessment of the 
merits of each of these latter renewable energy 
technologies is duly left in the responsibility of 
corresponding experts in the respective energy 
subfields.
  
Potential and Risk Assessment: Fossil Fuels
The conventional fossil fuels comprise nat-
ural gas, oil in different consistencies, and dif-
ferent types (ranks) of coal. The U.S. presently 
consumes daily 3.6 million short tons of coal, 22 
million barrels of oil and 63 billion cf of natural 
gas (EIA, 2006). Coal ranks from low-quality lig-
nite to carbon-rich and dense anthracite. In ad-
dition, with the decline of world resources in 
liquid crude oil, more unconventional sources 
like shale oil and tar sands are exploited. In the 
longer term, abundant methane hydrates may 
also assume an important role in the global 
energy economy. 
Fossil fuels consist basically of complex hy-
drocarbon chain molecules (CnHm). They provide 
energy through combustion, a process in which
chemical energies H of molecular bonding are 
set free by molecular decomposition and atom-
ic rearrangement. Rearrangement reactions of 
the type
CnHm + (n+m/4)O2 nCO2+(m/2)H2O + H     (1)
proceed under heat and in the presence of oxy-
gen (O2), where n and m are stoichiometric 
coefficients. Besides their function as primary 
energy sources, such complex organic com-
pounds serve as feedstock for the petrochemi-
cal industry, used to make anything from ferti-
lizer to plastics and pharmaceuticals. In addi-
tion, with declining crude oil resources, petro-
leum for the transportation sector may have to 
be replaced partially by synthetic fuels con-
verted from coal, low-grade oil shale or tars 
(Probstein, 2006).
An increased long-term use of fossil fuels, in 
particular coal, faces opposition because of sev-
eral Strategic Issues:
A. Dangers associated with production;
B. Environmental hazards and damage in 
mining/production; 
C. Emission of airborne pollutants (par-
ticles, metals, GHG), smog;
D. Uncertainty about carbon capture and 
permanent sequestration;
E. Limitation of resources, economy.
 
A. Coal
The most valuable, high-energy density
coals have been formed over time spans of sev-
eral hundred million years (Carboniferous Pe-
riod). In the U.S., the great Appalachian coal 
bed is a result of long-term accumulation, com-
pression and heating of organic waste and its 
transformation into coal of high density and 
high carbon content. These resources are now 
largely exhausted in the U.S., as well as in the 
rest of the industrialized world. Their produc-
tion has also declined for environmental rea-
sons. On the other hand, coal found, e.g., in the 
Illinois Basin, in Wyoming and Montana (Powd-
er River Basin) is of much younger age and less-
er energy content. The corresponding heat con-
tents range from 14,000 Btu/ lb for anthracite 
down to app. 5,000 Btu/ lb for lignite (brown 
coal).
As shown in Fig. 1
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mining, animal habitat is destroyed along with 
the sustaining vegetation. Polluted acidic runoff 
from the mine sites, unimpeded by trees and 
other vegetation, poisons local rivers, creeks, 
and the main supplies of drinking water with 
(sulfuric) acid and heavy metals (Goodell, 2006).
 
Distribution of coal occurs through the con-
ventional fossil fuelled transportation infra-
structure, dominantly (60%) via an extensive 
railroad system but also by barge and truck 
(Perry, 1983). For example, approximately 50 
trains, each a mile or so long, leave the Powder 
River Basin daily, distributing its cargo around 
the country, a total of 220 million tons in 2004 
(Goodell, 2006). Transport essentially triples the 
cost of coal to the power plant operator. Power 
plants typically store only a month’s supply on 
site. The current U.S. railroad infrastructure is 
technologically outdated, underfunded and un-
safe, as demonstrated by the many derailments 
reported in the media. Since the system is al-
ready overloaded, it presents a bottleneck for 
any future expansion of coal based power gen-
eration in the U.S. Urgent and massive invest-
ment is needed to modernize and expand the 
U.S. railroad infrastructure. However, in the U.S. 
this task clearly is technologically and economi-
cally achievable.
Coal quality is measured not only in carbon 
content but also in terms of undesirable con-
tents of sulfur and toxic heavy metals. These 
impurities are of concern, since there is yet es-
sentially no capture of the waste arising from 
operation of coal mines or power plants. Flue 
gases from coal combustion contain most of the 
sulfur, as well as nitric oxides from the burn 
process. Photochemical and wet-phase oxida-
tion of nitric and sulfuric gases produces “acid 
rain” impacting biodiversity in water bodies and 
forests. The main metal contents of U.S. coal 
are mercury (0.01-33 ppm, Billings 1972), lead
( 10 ppm, Chow 1972), uranium ( 1 ppm,
McBride, 1978, Gabbard, 1993), thorium ( 3 
ppm, Gabbard, 1993) and radium (Chernousen-
ko, 1991), but also beryllium, chromium, man-
ganese, and arsenic are present. Although these 
substances are of great environmental concern,
even newer power plants routinely discharge a 
substantial fraction of the heavy-metal content
of coal into the waste stream, e.g., vent them 
into the air or release them into rivers. Collec-
tively, the coal-fueled power plants in the U.S.
release annually 48 tons of mercury. They are 
also the major source of airborne uranium (40 
tons annually) and radium. The heavy metal
pollutants eventually precipitate and find their
way into the human food supply. 
Attempts have been made by governments,
for example, by the U.S. (Clean Air Acts), Euro-
pean countries, and China, to limit the emission 
of sulfur oxides and heavy metals by more or 
less strict regulation. Switching from the sulfur 
rich eastern coals to the lighter western coals 
containing fewer pollutants, some power com-
panies were able to comply with regulations. As 
a positive result of this change in fuel and the 
installation of sulfur “scrubbers” in the flues of 
large power plants, the intensity of acid rain has 
somewhat diminished in the north-eastern U.S. 
However, overall legislation has been timid and 
its success has been varied. For example, sub-
stantial emission reductions for mercury are re-
quired mostly for new “clean” power plants and 
will likely take effect only over decade-long pe-
riods (EPA, 2005). As yet no specific plans have 
been published dealing with some of the other 
heavy metal pollutants such as thorium and 
uranium. At present, coal power plants in the 
U.S. emit at least 100 times more of these sub-
stances than the nuclear power and processing 
plants (Gabbard, 1993).
Of even greater health concern are particu-
late matter emissions from coal-fired power 
plants, as well as from automobiles. Particulate 
matter (PM) includes airborne dust, dirt, soot, 
smoke, and liquid droplets. Fine particles (< 2.5 
µm in size) can be inhaled and lodge in the 
lungs (EPA, 2006). They cause respiratory and 
cardiovascular disease. PM pollution affects a 
very large fraction of the population, especially 
in large cities where the resulting smog and 
haze shorten life spans. Programs to reduce the 
PM pollution in the U.S. in the period from 1999
to 2006 effected a decrease of just 15% in PM 
output (EPA-PM2.5, 2006). It is objective of the 
DOE Strategic Plan (DOE, 2006) to essentially 
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remove entirely PM (PM2.5) from coal power 
plant emissions by 2020. Whether this can be 
done without new and strictly enforced regula-
tion is doubtful.
There are many R&D efforts in the U.S. and 
around the world to develop and test new 
“clean coal” burning technologies, which can 
solve some of the waste and pollution problems 
associated with fossil fuels (DOE, 2004). This is a 
prerequisite for coal to become again a main 
staple of energy economy. In addition to gene-
rating electricity, these technologies are also 
amenable to the production of hydrogen and 
synthetic liquid fuels, satisfying another basic 
requisite for a sustainable primary energy 
source. This capability is important in the pur-
suit of energy independence requiring flexible
response in times of acute or persistent oil or 
gas import shortages. For example, in a coal ga-
sification process developed by corporations 
such as Texaco and General Electric, coal, refi-
nery tars, and other organic substances are, in 
the presence of oxygen, exposed to high heat 
and pressure and thereby partially gasified. Sul-
fur and other impurities can be removed from 
the coal gas, leaving “syngas”, a mixture of CO2, 
CO, and H2, which in such plants drives a set of 
coupled turbine power generators.
This “Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle” (IGCC) has been used as design principle 
in several new coal power plants in the U.S. and 
Europe (Wabash River, 1999, GE, 2001, NETL, 
2002, Sarlux, 2007). The schematic flow dia-
gram of an IGCC coal power plan given in Fig. 2 
outlines the three main processes in coal refin-
ing: gasification under (separately produced) 
oxygen supply, gas component separation, and 
combined cycle combustion and steam reform-
ing. In the latter scheme, the hot exhausts of a 
gas turbine drive a conventional steam turbine. 
The IGCC plant is well suited for carbon cap-
ture. Carbon dioxide can be isolated and 
treated for onsite storage or transfer. For ex-
ample, CO2 in exhaust gases led through a mo-
noethanolamine (MEA) solution forms a loosely 
bound chemical compound, from which it is re-
leased again by heating. The gas can also be 
reacted with magnesium oxide to form magne-
sium carbonate for storage. Most significantly, 
under high compression at low temperatures 
syngas is transformed into methanol (CH3OH). 
Here, the CO2 component combines with H2 ac-
cording to the (catalytic) reaction
 
            CO2 + 3H2 CH3OH +H2O + H             (2) 
The enthalpy H (=-9.8 kcal/mol) quantifies the 
energy release in this exothermic reaction, 
which is partially converted into electricity (at 
high process temperature TH) but has partially 
Figure 2: Schematic flow diagram of IGCC coal power plant with hydrogen and synthetic fuel production, as well as carbon 
dioxide capture (DOE, 2003).
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to be taken out of the system by cooling (to an 
exhaust temperature TL as low as possible). The 
thermodynamic efficiency of this (or any other 
thermal) energy conversion process is limited. It 
depends on the temperature spread TH -TL and 
cannot exceed
 
max (1 - TL/TH)                             (3)
Here, the temperatures TL and TH are measured 
on the absolute Kelvin scale (degree K = 0C + 
273). For typical power plants, 0.3 - 0.4 but 
can exceed 0.6 for a modern IGCC plant Cooling 
requires ample supply of fresh water derived, 
e.g., from a nearby river. Hence the ubiquitous 
characteristic cooling towers. In “cogeneration,” 
where the still relatively hot exhaust gases are 
used for residential heating, TL is lowered fur-
ther and the overall process efficiency is in-
creased. However, to take advantage of this ef-
ficiency requires proximity of large power 
plants to residential areas.
The carbon monoxide in the syngas pro-
duced in IGCC plants can be reacted with hy-
drogen, similar to Equ. (2), to produce the liquid
fuel methanol. In addition, when reacted in H2
excess, carbon oxides can be reformed to am-
monia (NH3), which is also a byproduct of oil re-
fining. A number of other industrial processes of 
coal liquefaction have been used extensively in 
the past and are immediately available. They in-
clude the well-known Fischer-Tropsch process 
based on the schematic catalytic sum reaction
         CO + 2H2  (--CH2--) + H2O                (4) 
 
Here the parentheses indicate a mixture of sev-
eral gaseous and liquid compounds, which have 
to be separated. Large scale applications of the 
process are presently running in South Africa
(Sasol I-III) providing synthetic transportation 
fuels for the nation. More modern, simpler and 
more efficient processes can be used to pro-
duce methanol as liquid synfuel in plants that 
are part of, or coupled to, an IGCC plant.
Importantly, Fig. 2 illustrates the complexity of 
an advanced IGCC power plant, which can take 
up to 6 years to construct and put online at a 
cost of the order of $3B. For power companies, 
the design makes therefore direct economical 
sense only for fairly large plants with at least 
0.8-1 GWe in power production. The total costs 
for capture and storage of a ton of CO2 on site 
have been estimated to $25, corresponding to 
some $60 per ton of coal. This expense is ex-
pected to raise the production cost of coal elec-
tricity from 4¢/kWhe to 6¢/kWhe. Such cost 
considerations are the main reasons why in the 
U.S. most construction permits, even for new 
coal power plants, have not been of the expen-
sive IGCC type. Energy policies employing “car-
bon caps” or “carbon taxes and trading,” may
be required to redirect trends.
Motivated by concerns about the impact of 
anthropogenic GHG emissions on the global 
climate and biosphere, carbon capture and se-
quester (CCS) methods are investigated (NETL, 
2005), by which CO2 emitted by fossil fuel burn-
ing power plants could be deposited in perma-
nent repositories. After all, carbon dioxide 
makes up for 60% of the GHG totals. Yearly, the 
U.S. alone produces 5.7 Gt of CO2, or 20 tons 
per capita per year. To avoid CO2 release into 
the atmosphere, the gas has to be isolated and 
captured, before it can be permanently depo-
sited. The modern coal power plant envisioned 
in the FutureGen development program (DOE, 
2004) features a closed gas/steam cycle and the 
onsite capture of all pollutants. As illustrated in 
the artist’s view of such a modern coal power 
plant reproduced in Fig. 3, the most striking dif-
ference in appearance of IGCC plants is the ab-
Figure 3: Artist's view of a "FutureGen" IGCC clean coal 
power plant with CO2 capture (DOE, 2004). The insert 
shows the photograph of a conventional coal power 
plant 
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sence of tall smoke stacks, which are the hall-
mark of conventional plants (insert in Fig.3).
The various carbon capturing sequestration 
and conversion schemes under study all require 
refined fuel treatment technology such as rea-
lized presently only in the very few new IGCC 
type coal power plants built in the U.S. and Eu-
rope. Prohibitively expensive technical retrofits, 
essentially reconstructions, would be required 
to allow at least CO2 capture also from older 
“dirty” power plants. It should therefore be-
come highest priority in a sustainable energy 
strategy to guarantee that all new coal power 
plants are licensed and built exclusively accord-
ing to “clean coal” (e.g., IGCC) specifications. At 
a minimum, this would concern the construc-
tion of the more than 150 major plants (154 GW 
until 2030, EIA 2006) previewed in the U.S. To 
this number, an increasing number of conver-
sions or replacements of conventional oil and
gas fired plants has to be added. 
Requiring permanent CO2 sequestration 
adds another major complication to the 
process, and another major expense. Already 
the capture and storage of CO2 at an IGCC plant 
would raise the cost of clean-coal generated 
electricity by approximately 50% and make coal 
economically less competitive for electricity 
production. The overall cost for the construc-
tion of a sufficiently large number of IGCC clean 
coal power plants in the U.S. would be of the 
order of, even exceeding, 500 B$ over 20 years, 
requiring massive and sustained private and 
public investment. However, the prospect of 
coal as a basis for the production of liquid 
transportation fuel may turn out to be instru-
mental in gaining public support for a “clean 
coal” energy strategy. 
In principle, CO2 sequestration can be ac-
complished in various technological schemes. 
Biological carbon sinks can be created by plant-
ing trees or plankton algae farms which absorb 
atmospheric CO2 in their photosynthesis. The 
practice would require enormous arable land or 
ocean surface areas and planting efforts that
would go very much against the historical 
trends (deforestation).
 
Perhaps more promising geological seques-
tration involves pumping CO2 into depleted oil 
and gas reservoirs, under the deep sea bed, in 
other geologically stable pocketssuch as in dep-
leted coal seams, salt domes, or in porous se-
dimentary rock formations, where it could be 
safe for tens of millennia. Since oil reservoirs 
and coal seams are typically accompanied by 
natural gas or methane bubbles caught in anti-
clines of geological strata, geological sequestra-
tion of CO2 is feasible in principle and can be 
done relatively safely. This is also supported by 
the fact that, in the U.S., some natural geologi-
cal cavities are used extensively for temporary 
natural gas storage. Unfortunately, overall 
there are too few depleted oil wells or coal 
seams located conveniently in proximity of 
population centers serviced by coal power 
plants to make this method universally feasible
without long-range transfer of the gas.
Sequestering the gas at the bottom of the 
deep ocean sea, the prevailing high pressure 
would form a “CO2 lake.” Since the ocean water 
is not saturated in dissolved CO2, there is chem-
ically little risk for the gas to bubble through to 
the surface and be released into the atmos-
phere.
Since 1996, a large-scale test of ocean se-
questration has been underway some 250 km 
off the coast of Norway (Sleipner field). The 
project is schematically illustrated in Fig. 4. In 
this project, so far 8 Mt of CO2 have been 
pumped into a porous Utsira sandstone layer 
Figure 4: Schematics of StatOil’s CO2 sequestration 
project in the North Sea off the coast of Norway 
(Statoil).
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1,000 m under the bottom of the North Sea. 
The migration of the sequestered gas is moni-
tored seismographically.
Obvious ecological challenges of carbon se-
questration include the back diffusion of CO2 to 
the surface and environmental pressures result-
ing from changes in pH value (acidity), for ex-
ample, affecting maritime life. Sudden CO2 re-
lease from deposits induced by earthquakes or
volcanic eruptions poses potentially catastroph-
ic hazards that are well known from the 1986 
Cameroon Nyos Lake disaster. Here, 1700 lives 
were lost when such an eruption released sud-
denly large amounts of the heavier-than-air 
CO2, suffocating the nearby village population.
In case that CO2 leakage from the Sleipner sto-
rage site into the sea should occur, the gas 
would be readily absorbed by the sea and con-
stitute no harm to populations or sea lanes. This 
added safety feature does not exist in land se-
questration, requiring continuous long-term 
monitoring of the sequestration status.
In principle, chemical sequestration is also 
possible, for example, by using or accelerating 
“weathering” reactions binding CO2 to calcium 
compounds (Falkowski, 2000). Reacting CO2
with lime (CaO) produces limestone (CaCO3) 
suitable for temporary onsite storage. Heating 
limestone sets CO2 free and regenerates the 
lime. From these and other potential processes 
considered, it is clear that carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) schemes would only be 
economical if performed on a large scale and 
for large (> 1 GW) power plant complexes, 
which would also have to be located far from 
population centers. To give an illustration of the 
scale, capturing and compressing CO2 produced 
by existing U.S. coal power plants would require 
handling a volume of 50 million barrels per day 
(NPC, 2007), more than twice the oil volume 
moved in a day.
The U.S. DOE has provided a roadmap (DOE, 
2004, NETL, 2005, DOE, 2006) to encourage and 
steer corresponding R&D in CCS. The objective 
of DOE’s Clean Coal Program (DOE, 2006) is to 
demonstrate a zero-emission coal power plant 
by the year 2020. While carbon capture is tech-
nically feasible now and could be practiced, the 
viability of long-term carbon sequestration on 
dry land still has to be demonstrated, and 
enabling regulation has yet to be devised.
 
B. Oil and natural gas
Since the beginning of last century, inex-
pensive oil and, to a lesser extent, natural gas 
had displaced coal as a ubiquitous fuel and re-
shaped industrialized society. Oil products pro-
vide now about 40% of the energy consumed 
worldwide by industry and households, while 
gas and coal make up 25% each in that balance. 
In particular, crude oil derived petroleum, di-
esel, and kerosene fuels the transportation sys-
tem in the industrialized world. In the U.S., 
about 65% of the crude oil serves that purpose.
While the proven and likely coal reserves are 
substantial and could satisfy much of the 
world’s energy demand expected for this cen-
tury, such a statement cannot be made for 
crude oil. As shown in Fig. 5 (“Hubbert’s Peak”, 
GAO, 2007), the U.S. domestic oil production 
has peaked at about 10 million barrels of oil 
(bo) a day in the 1970s and has now declined to 
half that amount (NPC, 2007), while the increas-
ing consumption has now exceeded 20 million 
barrels per day. An illustration of the decreasing 
prospect of domestic and global oil production
is the fact that the major U.S. oil companies 
have not built a single new domestic oil refinery 
during the past 30 years. They are now even re-
ducing the number of refineries they own, from 
the present number of app. 150, by selling to 
Figure 5: Domestic U.S. oil production and consumption 
(NPC, 2007, GAO, 2007)
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independent operators. The 10 Mbo/d of oil 
presently imported into the U.S. already occupy 
2/3 of the throughput of the existing oil refine-
ries, which are running at capacity (17 Mbo/d).
There are still sizeable reserves of recover-
able oil, mostly (65%) in OPEC countries. Impor-
tant are those in the Middle East, notably in 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and the United 
Arab Emirates. Other, somewhat smaller re-
serves are found in Russian Siberia, Africa 
(Libya, Nigeria, and Angola), and South America 
(Venezuela). In comparison, the much debated 
recoverable crude oil resources located in the 
U.S. Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) are 
miniscule, covering perhaps 4% of the U.S. con-
sumption for a few years, 5-7 Gbo in total.
 
However, accurate assessment of oil re-
serves is not possible, and extrapolations of 
global oil production to the year of 2030 range 
from less than 80 to 140 million barrels a day 
(NPC, 2007). But accepting even such a low min-
imum reserve may turn out to be over optimis-
tic. There is presently no universally accepted 
reporting standard, and the numbers for crude 
oil reserves quoted by different agencies di-
verge significantly. In addition, it is of great 
practical consequence that estimates are not 
differentiated with respect to the ease with 
which the oil reserves can be extracted. Clearly, 
crude oil is much more economical to produce 
from Saudi Arabia’s land based oil wells than 
from below the seabed under the Gulf or the 
North Sea. In the Jack Field in the Gulf of Mex-
ico, Chevron now drills 30,000 feet under the 
seabed to find crude in porous rock (Grisholm 
Little, 2007), hoping to produce perhaps as 
much as 5 Gbo. Plausibly, the now ubiquitous 
oil platforms are expensive to construct and 
time consuming to put into operation. For ex-
ample, the Canadian Hibernia platform cost 5 
B$ and took 19 years from discovery to produc-
tion, while the Thunder Horse platform in the 
Gulf has cost so far 4 B$ and, eight years after 
discovery, has not yet taken up production 
(NPC, 2007). In addition to their high costs, oil 
platforms are susceptible to adverse weather 
conditions, as demonstrated by losses during 
the hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, which 
caused instabilities in oil markets that were 
deemed unacceptable by the public.
Particularly difficult to produce is crude 
from the Canadian sticky tar “oil sands,” a 
process requiring heat and large amounts of 
fresh water (McFarland, 2006). These latter re-
serves are so expensive to recover that some 
experts believe that they should be omitted 
from the roster of reserves. The remoteness of 
many of the oil fields from the consumers has
led to coining the term “stranded oil.”
Based on extensive data analysis, Deffeyes 
(Deffeyes, 2001) has predicted world oil pro-
duction to peak already before 2008. Although 
that estimate may turn out to be slightly pessi-
mistic, most expert studies agree that crude oil 
world production will have declined significantly 
within 15-30 years, well before mid century.
The actual extent of the “cheap oil era” defining 
the modern industrial economies depends on 
multiple, uncertain factors, including possible 
improvements of recovery factors by new pro-
duction techniques (horizontal drilling, steam or 
CO2 forcing, etc.). Obviously, the future indus-
trial growth rates, associated increase in global 
competition for crude oil and unfavorable polit-
ical and investment conditions in countries with
oil reserves will play major roles in shortening 
the cheap-oil era, even before the world re-
serves run out. Because of the dominating role 
of oil as a primary energy source, the conse-
quences for the industrialized world will be sub-
stantial.
Compared to coal mining, the hazards of oil 
production are comparatively small. The distri-
bution of oil from remote regions to refineries
and consumers is considered relatively safe, and 
casualties are rare. Within the U.S. most of the 
transfer of crude oil and refined products is ac-
complished by a system of approximately 
200,000 miles of a mainly underground pipe-
lines, driven by powerful pumps every 50-70 
miles. The Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) 
is a notable exception running mostly above 
ground. A network of 55,000 miles of large di-
ameter (8”-34”dia., $1M/mile) crude oil trunk 
pipe lines is operated by companies like Shell, 
BP, Exxon Mobile, and others (see Fig. 6). 
 12 Energy Strategy 
Pipelines are also used to move various refinery 
products (gasoline, diesel, heating oil, kero-
sene). The systems serve a large number of 
terminals with substantial storage capacity, 
functioning as hubs for local distribution. Only 
the latter task is dominantly accomplished by 
tanker trucks. 
Nevertheless, fatal accidents have occurred 
in this energy sector and oil transport has been 
marred with the ecological disasters of numer-
ous spills. In 1998, a massive oil explosion in the 
Niger Delta claimed more than five hundred 
lives (Darley, 2004). In addition, in 2001 the U.S. 
oil pipeline system suffered 129 spills larger 
than 50 barrels (2100 gal). Perhaps the most 
memorable oil spill is that of the EXXON Valdez 
in the Prince William Sound in 1989. In that ac-
cident, 11 million gallons of crude oil leaked out 
of the tanker, spoiled some 1,300 miles of the 
coast of Alaska, killed uncounted wildlife, and 
interrupted regional economic activities. Acci-
dent related costs amounted to several B$, and 
the cleanup took more than a decade to ac-
complish.
In spite of accidents and spills, the pipeline 
mode is regarded as the only technically and 
economically feasible distribution method. Be-
cause of its relatively low energy density (caloric 
value), the liquid volume that has to be moved 
is much too large for significant long-distance 
transport via rail, barge, or truck. If required by 
future demand and economy, the major pipe-
line network can be expanded with existing 
technology at the cost of approximately 
1M$/mi.
Hazards associated with combustion are 
similar for all fossil fuels, as far as sulfuric and 
nitric gases or small particulates are concerned. 
Like coals, crude oils from different regions 
have different admixtures of sulfur. Because of 
the lower energy density of oil, however, specif-
ic GHG emission from oil combustion is en-
hanced (~10:7) as compared to coal. On the 
other hand, heavy metal content of oil is small-
er than the mercury, thorium, and uranium con-
tent of coal. Hence, also a lesser amount of ra-
dioactivity is released in the combustion of oil
than in coal burning. Nevertheless, the ammo-
nia and mercury in the toxic waste stream from 
oil refineries led into rivers and lakes generates 
conditions adverse to aquatic life. So have re-
cent expansion plans for an Indiana Marathon 
refinery been met with strong opposition from 
environmental and residential groups con-
cerned about the already highly polluted Lake 
Superior (NPR, 2007).
 
Together with oil, natural gas makes up 
about 60% of the world’s present primary ener-
gy consumption (NPC, 2007). The gas consists 
mainly of methane (85-95%), a highly potent 
GHG, some higher hydro-carbons, and nitrogen. 
The fact that in turbines and generators natural
gas burns much cleaner and more efficiently
than oil has motivated a widely spread switch 
from coal and oil to gas. This switch occurred 
somewhat later than generally expected (Smil, 
2005) because its 1000-fold lower energy densi-
ty (34 MJ/m3) than oil makes gas more expen-
sive to distribute and less suitable as a transpor-
tation fuel. Therefore, natural gas is now mostly 
produced for residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial consumption. Beside its role as primary 
energy source, natural gas is an important 
feedstock for chemicals, pharmaceuticals, ferti-
lizer, fabrics and plastics. 
Annual U.S. consumption in natural gas 
was app. 23 Tcf in 2004 (EIA, 2005), correspond-
ing to 63 Bcf/day. The most recent data for pro-
duction and consumption are depicted in Fig. 7 
(NPC, 2007). The current trends are declining
both in demand and production, which is par-
tially attributable to the high cost of natural gas 
as compared to coal. Yet, other reports (DOE-
Figure 6: Selected U.S. crude pipeline systems (Allegro 
Energy Group)
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NETL, 2005) predict again slight increases in U.S. 
domestic production and gains in natural gas 
consumption by 50% by 2025. According to 
some sources (EIA, 2006), approximately 130 
GWe in new construction of gas-fired power 
plants are previewed until 2030.
   
Figure 7: U.S. natural gas production and consumption 
(NPC, 2007).
Naturally, the gas occurs often together with 
oil or coal (CBM, coal bed methane). Typically 
the gas is trapped in a bubble above an oil re-
servoir or in a coal bed. It can leak naturally or
escape in the mining process, in either case 
adding to the atmospheric GHG repertory. Since 
it provides an explosion hazard at the produc-
tion site, the gas is still mostly been “flared off”
at an oil wellhead, i.e., just burned at the pro-
duction site. At night, huge Russian, Iranian, 
Arab (Qatar), and Nigerian natural gas flares are 
easily seen from space pinpointing substantial 
gas resources. Other reserves are located in Tri-
nidad/Tobago, the Asia/Pacific Basin (Indone-
sia), the South China Sea, Australia, and in the 
Arctic seabed. Similar to oil, the extent of the 
world’s recoverable natural gas resources is 
subject to debate. Typical estimates (DOE-NETL, 
2005) of gas reserves amount to 6,000 Tcf, cor-
responding to just 60 years of present global 
consumption. Given a rapid increase in global 
demand, Hubbert’s peak for gas may occur long 
before mid-century, relegating natural gas to 
the status of a rather finite resource. Certainly, 
domestic gas production will be insufficient to 
satisfy the projected U.S. gas demand of 6-7 Tcf 
by 2025 (DOE-NETL, 2005). 
Therefore, most of the gas for the planned 
power plants would have to be imported, likely
in form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Although 
expensive and vulnerable, the LNG delivery 
technique is suggested by the remoteness of 
natural gas resources. Liquefaction plants have 
to be constructed at the production site, typi-
cally at a cost of 1.5-2 B$ per plant. In future, al-
ternative solutions may be used instead, such as 
currently tested in Qatar, where natural gas is 
converted to synthetic gasoline prior to ship-
ment. Steam reforming of natural gas, as used 
with syngas in the Fischer-Tropsch process, to-
gether with partial oxidation at high tempera-
ture is an expensive but feasible method to 
convert gas into synthetic gasoline (“synfuel”).
The method is being explored by industrial 
companies in several countries.
In the regular LNG process, the multiple li-
quefaction/ revaporization cycles and the cryo-
genic cooling to -1620C required during transfer 
are expensive and energy intensive. This and 
evaporative losses reduce the available energy 
content of the gas to app. 75% of its initial val-
ue. The process requires super-insulated sto-
rage and transfer vessels with multi-layered 
walls some 6’ thick (see Fig. 8). Super tankers 
with capacities exceeding 200,000 tons are pre-
sently developed for LNG shipping. The energy 
content of such a ship resembles that effective
in a small nuclear device. The lack of armor of 
these tankers and their unprotected exposure 
on the open sea lanes makes them soft targets. 
To an even larger extent, such a concern applies 
to the new, high-capacity LNG terminals.
Figure 8: LNG terminal at Elba Island/ GA. The inset sche-
matic of an LNG super tanker exhibits a hull with multiple 
shells. On the left a multi-layered super insulating 
double-hull cutout. After (DOE-NETL, 2005)
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LNG operations in the past have not been 
accident free. After the earlier fatal LNG explo-
sions of 1944 and 1973 in the U.S. (Darley, 
2004), in 2004 several LNG trains exploded in 
Skikda/Algeria, claiming 31 lives and injuring 74. 
These repeated LNG accidents motivate serious
security considerations of an “LNG economy,”
which would have per week a fleet of 100 or 
more LNG super tankers crossing the Atlantic, 
to be received and unloaded at U.S. terminals.
  
The U.S. has currently only 6 LNG terminals, 
where LNG is received, regasified, stored short 
term, and pumped into an extensive system of 
presently 280,000 miles of gas pipe lines. In-
termediate short-term LNG storage occurs at 
buffering (“peak-shaving”) facilities, which 
scoop gas from the pipeline system and liquefy 
it for storage, to be able to revaporize and re-
lease the LNG again in times of peak demand. In 
the U.S., construction of 20 to 30 new LNG ter-
minals is under consideration (DOE-NETL, 2005, 
Romm, 2005). It is noteworthy that the capacity 
of such a large number of LNG terminals would
at most be sufficient to handle 50% of the pro-
jected imports. There are a number of reasons 
for this projected limitation. Certainly one of 
them is that the cost for construction and oper-
ation of an LNG chain, from production to deli-
very, is substantial (7-10 B$). However, other
reasons, like uncertainty about future accessi-
bility, safety, and profitability of LNG all play 
important roles. The actual rate of increase in 
U.S. LNG consumption will also be subject to in-
ternational competition, in particular from Ja-
pan, which is now the major LNG importer.
From the documented facts collected and 
listed above, which are all in the public domain, 
one has to conclude that among the fossil ener-
gy sources neither oil nor natural gas satisfies 
the requirements for a dependable primary 
energy source. In either case, the domestic peak 
production has been passed in the U.S. or is 
imminent, making the resource not abundant 
enough for a sustainable long-term energy 
economy. Similar observations hold for most 
other industrialized nations. Occasional minor 
new oil field discoveries could delay and miti-
gate the demise of the “cheap-oil economy” but 
cannot prevent it. To initiate a transition to 
another primary energy source is therefore ur-
gent. 
Countries in North America, Eurasia, Asia 
and South Africa, including the U.S., are in the 
fortunate position to have abundant and reco-
verable domestic energy resources in the form 
of coal. Here, coal generated fuels can provide a 
durable pillar and stability for the economy and 
displace oil and gas to the extent that these lat-
ter resources are depleted. However, sizeable 
investments have to be made to resolve the 
Strategic Issues for coal and make it a more be-
nign, versatile, and acceptable primary energy 
source:
a) The hazards of mining have to be reduced 
significantly, e.g., by further introduction of re-
motely controlled robotics;
b) Restoration of ecology after open-pit 
mining has to be mandated (and made part of 
the price of doing business);
c) Emission of pollutants/GHG has to be re-
duced to acceptable levels, e.g., by CCS/IGCC
“clean-coal” and CCS strategies; and 
d) Petro-based transportation fuels should 
be increasingly replaced by synthetic fuels, 
achievable also with a new generation of IGCC 
plants.
These tasks are all achievable with existing 
technology but, of course, at a price. Good cost 
estimates of such a scenario are not available, 
but a rough extrapolation suggests that a doubl-
ing of the coal fraction in the U.S. energy mix, 
under the clean coal scenario, may require 
funding of the order of a trillion US$ over the 
next three decades. Since they concern infra-
structure investments used by several future 
generations, an informed public will consider 
such efforts feasible and worthwhile.
Potential and Risk Assessment: Renewable 
Energy Sources
The development and large-scale utilization 
of a variety of renewable primary energy 
sources should be an ultimate goal of any long-
term energy science policy. In recent decades 
development of such technologies has been en-
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couraged and their use has been highly subsi-
dized. In several countries corresponding R&D 
has been well funded and at increased levels. 
For example, in Germany renewable energy 
production has been subsidized both directly 
and by tax incentives. Energy producers using 
renewable technologies are paid rates needed 
to recover their investment in the long term 
(Morris, 2006). Thus renewable energy can cost 
up to US$ 0.15-0.20 per kWh, a factor of up to 
three higher than retail energy cost.
 
In order to make renewables economically 
viable and scalable, significant technological 
barriers have to be overcome. However, never 
is energy generation cost free or environmen-
tally benign, as illustrated below for a few re-
newables.
Renewable energy resources face several 
Strategic Issues due to their
a) Comparatively low energy densities and ef-
ficiencies; 
b) Intermittency, subject to local weather, di-
urnal or seasonal fluctuations; 
c) Substantial impact on local climate, ecosys-
tems, and human habitat;
d) Uncompetitive high price per produced 
kWh;
e) Long (“pay-back”) times for capital or ener-
gy investment recovery.
Customarily, the broader category of “re-
newable” energy resource encompasses hydro-
electric power and the “green” energy sources 
of geo-thermal, wind and solar energy, as well 
as energy produced from biomass (wood, grass, 
etc.). At present, only hydro-power contributes 
significantly to the overall electrical energy 
generation in industrialized countries. The U.S. 
has 80 GW installed in conventional hydro-
electrical power plants contributing some 8% to 
the electricity generated in the country, while 
the “green” energy sources fall at or below a to-
tal of 2%.
 
A. Hydroelectric power generation
Availability of hydropower is obviously con-
tingent upon precipitation levels and naturally 
undergoes seasonal fluctuations. In particular 
during droughts or hot and dry summers, when 
electricity is at a premium, hydropower is less 
available. Hydro-electric power generation de-
pends on the hydrodynamics of a relatively 
slow, laminar flow of water through generator 
driving water turbines. Therefore the efficiency 
of this mode of energy generation is relatively 
low, and hydro-power plants are often operat-
ed only as auxiliary facilities, not to provide 
base load. 
Most of the growth potential of hydropow-
er is in Asia, South America, and the territories 
of the former Soviet Union. In the U.S. and most 
industrialized countries, the growth potential of 
the hydro-electric power sector is rather li-
mited. Since most large rivers have already 
been dammed, only few new plants could con-
ceivably be built and operated economically. On 
the other hand, many dams and plants are 
nearing their useful design life of app. 50 years.
Contributing rivers and reservoirs have accumu-
lated sludge and need excavation and restora-
tion. In particular, important questions of how 
eventually to decommission large dams have 
only been posed recently, and convincing an-
swers have yet to be found.
In addition, great environmental concerns 
have been raised against construction of new 
hydro-power plants. The flooding of huge areas 
destroys not only forest and wildlife habitat. As 
a standing body of water, reservoirs develop an 
anaerobic and/or H2S toxic environment that is 
hostile to aquatic live. For example, the dis-
solved oxygen (DO) levels in Canadian reservoirs 
are so low that wood of the inundated forests is 
well preserved, making underwater logging of 
these forests profitable for companies. Other,
tropic reservoirs are thought to contribute sig-
nificantly to GHG emission (WCD, 2000).
In the flooding necessary to create reser-
voirs, human settlements have to be aban-
doned as well. More importantly, a number of 
dam ruptures have claimed numerous lives. To 
recall just a few, major recent accidents oc-
curred 1979 in Morvi/ India (30,000 fatalities), 
1975 in Banqiao/China (86,000 fatalities), and 
1972 in Logan/USA (450 fatalities). In more sub-
tle and unpredictable ways, reshaping and re-
routing of the natural river system change the 
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ecology. Affected for example are runoff and 
sedimentation in river deltas with conse-
quences for the associated coastal wetlands.
  
Figure 9: Two views of the Chinese Three Gorges Dam 
project, under construction in 2003.
One of the exceptional new hydro-electric 
power plants is the gigantic, 25-B$, 18-GW 
Three Gorges Dam (TGD) project (Fig. 9) on the 
Chinese Yangtze River, scheduled to go online in 
2009. The reservoir extends 600 km upstream
from the 2-km long, 185-m high dam. Its con-
struction has required the destruction of hun-
dreds of villages and the displacement of an es-
timated 1.3 million persons. While the direct 
TGD construction costs should be recovered 
within 15 years of plant operation, the substan-
tial collateral costs of the loss of arable land, fi-
shery, and generally human livelihoods have 
not been estimated. 
There are other, more exotic methods to ex-
tract energy from moving water bodies, such as 
from the ocean swell or the tidal waves. How-
ever, the economy of these methods has not 
yet been proven to be attractive. Hence, hydro-
power in its various present concepts is not ex-
pected to provide important answers to the fu-
ture energy demand.
B. Geothermal energy
In principle, geothermal energy is ubiquitous 
and virtually inexhaustible, because of the exist-
ing temperature profile of the planet. In prac-
tice, because of the generally weak tempera-
ture gradient in most locations, the economy of 
large-scale, renewable geothermal energy pro-
duction is correlated with existing geological ac-
tivity, such as volcanic or tectonic motion in the 
Earth’s crust. The former is available, and heavi-
ly exploited, in Iceland, the latter along the Pa-
cific Rim. Geothermal power plants targeting 
water in hot underground geothermal reser-
voirs also try to tap into a non-renewable ener-
gy resource. The efficiency of a more generic 
method of energy extraction, cycling surface 
water under pressure through hot dry bedrock 
at depths of several thousand feet faces tech-
nological hurdles which will be challenging and 
expensive to bypass.
The problems facing geothermal extraction 
technology are due to the fundamental ther-
modynamics of entropic heat flow. With pre-
sently only 3 GW produced, geothermal energy 
generation is marginal in the U.S. and will prob-
ably remain so, unless and until these funda-
mental barriers are overcome.
C. Biomass energy production
Burning of biomass such as wood and ani-
mal manure (dung) is a relatively inefficient me-
thod of energy production ranging back to pre-
historic times. More recently, biomass based 
methods have been proposed to produce bio-
diesel and ethanol-type fuels for the transporta-
tion sector. In WWII and post-WWII Europe,
wood gas, a rather inefficient fuel, was used 
temporarily in the transportation sector.
The method of deriving energy from annual 
crops, rather than from forests or fossil source, 
is hampered by low energy yield, the need for 
large amounts of fertilizer, and the vulnerability 
of crops to weather and drought conditions. In 
contrast to its fossil equivalent, the small ener-
gy yield of 50 W/km2 (Andrews & Jelley, 2007) 
obtained with the present biomass technology
requires unacceptably large arable land areas 
and massive amounts of nitrous fertilizer to 
produce significant amounts of fuel. Effects of 
pollution generated by over fertilization and of 
long-term agricultural monoculture drive envi-
ronmental concerns about biomass energy 
technology. It also appears ethical and untena-
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ble to use food for transportation fuel rather 
than for human sustenance. In addition, such 
policy will hasten the end of a cheap-food era.
An important argument made in favor of 
fuels derived from biomass is their CO2 neutrali-
ty, although this argument does not extend to 
nitrous gases, which are also produced in bio-
mass combustion. As base for such biofuels, 
one uses sugar cane in South America, rapeseed 
in Europe, and corn in the U.S. These synthetic 
fuels are blended with gasoline in different pro-
portions. By 2010, European countries are 
claiming to have a fraction of approximately 6% 
of the consumed fuel generated from biomass 
(Morris, 2006). 
However, even such modest predictions are 
viewed by many as too optimistic. For example, 
it appears debatable even, whether or not the 
production of ethanol from corn and other 
biomass has a positive or negative energy bal-
ance. A Cornell/Berkeley study (Pimentel, 2005) 
reporting negative energy balance for the pro-
duction of ethanol from various plants has been
contradicted by others (NBB, 2005). The ques-
tion has to be considered as open.
Currently, the process biomass/ fuel conver-
sion is profitable to the agro-industry mainly 
because of farming subsidies granted by the 
government. In the U.S. ethanol production 
uses currently some 14% of the corn stocks 
(USDA, 2006). In most countries this type of 
land use does, or would, conflict and compete 
with food production. Already at this early stage 
of biomass utilization, rising corn prices have 
been reported (DoA, 2007, Brainard, 2007) in 
the U.S. attributed directly to the new use of 
the plant for bio-fuel production.
 
The core barrier in exploiting the more ab-
undant energy source inherent in the cellulosic 
biomass consists in the difficulties associated 
with biological and chemical degradation of the 
material that eventually leads to ethanol pro-
duction. A research initiative has been ad-
vanced by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE-
BIOM, 2006) to find energy richer cellulosic 
crops and more efficient biomass/ fuel conver-
sion processes. To judge the further prospects 
of biomass for energy generation will have to 
await R&D expected to become available by 
2015-2020. The expectations are at best guar-
dedly optimistic.
D. Wind energy
Wind power is currently the most important 
of the alternative (“green”) energy technolo-
gies. Similar to hydro-mechanically driven mills 
and simple machines, the effects of mechanical 
drag and lift produced by aerodynamic flow 
have been utilized to generate energy (work) 
since centuries. The tall wind towers housing 
powerful electric wind turbines that seem to 
spring up in many locations, mainly around Eu-
rope, are simply modern realizations of 13th and 
14th century European rotating-tower, horizon-
tal-axis windmills. They convert ubiquitous me-
chanical wind energy directly into electricity, 
without the detour via thermal plants. In the 
U.S., early wind farms have been installed at the 
Altamont Pass in California with over 5,000 rela-
tively small wind towers (Fig. 10, top).
To utilize the higher wind speeds at alti-
tude, the newest designs feature towers up to 
100-150 m tall and have 2-or 3-blade propellers 
with diameters of more than d = 100 m, which 
Figure 10: Partial view of wind farm (California) (Top). 
Efficiency recorded in 2004 for the electric power gen-
eration of a large scale assembly of wind farms (E.ON, 
2005)
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rotate with 10-30 rpm, corresponding to blade 
tip speeds of up to 130 mph. Advanced turbines
generate up to 5 MW but more typical is 1-3
MW. The popular Vesta V90 turbine plant has a 
total height of 150 m to the blade tip and is 
rated at 3 MWe. Wind turbines have an opera-
tional range of useful wind speeds (3-25 m/s);
they are unusable in either low- or high-wind 
conditions. Propellers blades have to be “fea-
thered” in high winds to avoid damage. Aero-
dynamics dictates minimum distances of r = (5-
10)·d between the individual units of a “wind 
farm” (Sørensen, 2000), requiring an area of 
app. 105m2/MW. A modern 500-unit wind farm 
producing nominally a power of 1 GW requires 
thus the substantial land area of 100 km2.
 
Wind farms, often touted as the most envi-
ronmentally friendly mode of energy genera-
tion, have nevertheless met with increasing re-
sistance by the public. Concerns, which are dif-
ficult to quantify, range from the negative es-
thetic impact of wind farms on scenery to dis-
turbing propeller noise. However, concrete en-
vironmental hazards created by these plants 
have been demonstrated by the observed aver-
age fatality rates per turbine and year of 2.3 
birds and 3.4 bats, which have been reported 
for the U.S. in 2004 (NWCC, 2004). In addition, a 
large number of insects is struck by wind mill 
propellers. It is currently not known to what ex-
tent the avian mortality signals an emerging,
deeper, and perhaps more significant, long-
term ecological consequence of wind power.
The dissatisfying economics of wind power 
are more immediately and objectively accessi-
ble. They have been studied and reported 
(E.ON, 2005) for Germany, which has become
the global leader in the use of this technology. 
In 2004, the country operated wind farms rated 
at a total of 16.4 GWe. The E.ON Group control-
ling 7 GW of that capacity describes some of the 
issues faced in large-scale field operation:
Wind power feeds energy into the grid only 
at a fraction of the rated power of the 
plants.
In principle, wind power in present tech-
nology can replace conventional power 
plants only to a limited extent.
Predictions of wind power feed into the 
grid are highly inaccurate. 
A new electric grid infrastructure is needed 
for wind power.
An important, illustrative data set is provided in 
Fig. 10 (bottom panel), showing the percentage 
power feed into the German electric grid by the 
E.ON group’s 7-GW extended ensemble of wind 
farms. The actual numbers fluctuate wildly be-
tween 0.2% and 38% in 2004 (E.ON, 2005). 
Both intermittency and low yearly average 
has led industry analysts to the estimate that by 
2020, even under optimistic conditions of 40 
GW rated wind power installed, only 4% of con-
ventional power plants can nominally be re-
placed by wind power (E.ON, 2005). Even more 
significantly (and memorable), for every 1 GW 
of new wind power generators, new power 
plants of 1 GW of traditional technology would 
have to be put online (E.ON, 2005). Continuous-
ly running conventional (fossil fuel and/or nuc-
lear) power plants with a stand-by capacity 
equal to the maximum wind power are re-
quired. This odd relationship could be remedied 
by future new grid and energy storage technol-
ogies. In the interim, a new very-high voltage 
electric power grid is to be built, which would 
accept and dampen associated fluctuations.
Accepting even the optimistic predictions 
by the interested, highly subsidized industry,
one concludes that for the next few decades 
wind power is not likely to play a major role in
the base load energy portfolio of industrialized 
nations. As overall power demand increases, 
the fraction of wind power will even diminish
(E.ON, 2005). Specifically, wind power cannot 
be expected to provide reliably the base power 
load on which an economy has to rely. Future 
breakthroughs in energy storage or grid tech-
nologies could change the prospects of wind 
power.
E. Solar energy
The continuous direct influx of solar radia-
tion energy (“ insolation”= 1 kW/m2) on the sur-
face of the earth is many orders of magnitude 
larger than what is needed to sustain human 
energy demand. This fact has inspired the im-
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agination of the public and has generated prob-
ably unrealistic expectations of the ease with 
which future energy demand could be satisfied
at a sustainable level. Unfortunately, even after 
decades of generous funding of the solar tech-
nology sector, starting in the 1960s with NASA’s 
space program, technical/economic problems 
associated with conversion, capture and storage
of sun radiation have remained largely unre-
solved. Correspondingly, in the U.S. presently 
only 0.02% of the electricity is generated direct-
ly from solar radiation. 
The most popular technology employs pho-
tovoltaic (PV) silicon (Si) cells converting radia-
tion directly into electricity. PV cells are ar-
ranged in solar panels. They are constructed as 
thin layers of “doped” Si (300 m), window lay-
ers, and metallic contact films on a glass sub-
strate. The doping, diffusing into the Si lattice 
atoms of electron donating and accepting mate-
rials, produces a diode device, which in its 
“dark” state has no free charge carriers (elec-
trons or holes). Photons within a narrow band 
of wave lengths (energies) of the solar spectrum 
can be absorbed by the Si diode by promoting 
electrons from the lower (valence) band of elec-
tronic states to the higher (conduction) band, 
which produces a net electric current that can 
drive a load. Photons of higher than the charac-
teristic Si-gap energy are ineffective, lead to a 
heating of the crystal lattice and a deterioration 
of its effective qualities. The overall conversion 
efficiency of a Si PV cell is a combination of sur-
face reflectivity, absorption probability and in-
ternal power conversion probability. 
As shown in Fig. 11 plotting efficiency vs. 
areal cost of PV cells, there are hard physical 
limits to the theoretical conversion efficiency 
for solar radiation. The currently accessible do-
main is labeled as Region I in this figure. Since 
the Si crystal material used for the production 
of the most efficient Si PV cells is a byproduct of 
computer chip production, PV unit costs have 
benefited from the efficiency of the computer 
industry. 
The production of Si wafers occurs currently 
in clean laboratories and factories, which limit 
environmental impact. Nevertheless, the 
process requires handling of chemical toxins 
such as concentrated acids used in surface 
preparation (etching). A future production of PV 
cells in numbers large enough to satisfy a signif-
icant fraction of the energy demand would re-
quire handling and deposition of enormous 
quantities (many thousand tons) of these toxic 
chemicals, not only acids but also poisonous ar-
senic, selenium, indium, and other toxic mate-
rials (Eerkens, 2006). The environmental prob-
lems associated with PV production would grow 
to proportions characteristic of large-scale
chemical industry.
  
Figure 11: Efficiency of photo voltaic cells vs. areal cost 
(Lewis, 2007).  
Currently the efficiency of direct energy con-
version by commercial photo-voltaic solar cells
is of the order of 15%, which is insufficient to 
make the technology economically viable. As an 
illustrative example, the integrated solar insola-
tion of 1GWh/m2 typical for Northern Europe or 
America, combined with the 15% efficiency of 
PV cells, translates to a specific energy conver-
sion density of 150kWh/m2. To displace the 7 
TWh of energy produced yearly by one conven-
tional 1-GW power plant requires an effective 
are of 46 km2 covered with Si PV panels. This ar-
ray of solar panels would presently cost 20-30 
B$. Such an amount would pay for 5-10 nuclear 
power plants, each of similar capacity (1 GW). 
In addition, while the PV efficiency is initially 
close to 15%, the exposure of cells to radiation, 
weather and other interactions (bird droppings, 
sand blasting and deposition) causes lattice 
damage and surface erosion. These effects de-
grade PV cell performance significantly after 
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prolonged use in the open field, for example in 
a sand desert (Smil, 2005). In practice, the use-
ful life of solar panels may be much shorter 
than the 30 years often assumed.
New R&D is underway exploring ways to en-
hance efficiency and handling of solar cells. 
More complex, multi-layered, multi-well PV 
cells would absorb and convert a larger portion 
of the solar spectrum. Semiconductor materials 
such as GaAs, CdS, or CdTe are more efficient 
than Si, which has poor light absorbance. But 
these materials are also more expensive to pro-
duce. Other routes include cheaper amorphous
silicon, rather than single-crystals. In principle, 
it is possible to emulate the electronic band 
structure that is absent from amorphous Si by 
chemical treatment. However, stable semicon-
ductor diodes have not yet been produced by 
such technology.
 
Similarly, higher efficiencies could be 
reached with thin-film, flexible PV cells, if effi-
cient light trapping technologies can be devel-
oped. Presently, their efficiency is even smaller 
than that of conventional Si photovoltaic cells. 
Some hope to overcome theoretical (e.g., 
Shockley-Queisser) efficiency limits (Fig. 11) by 
developing new semi-conducting materials 
(PbS) and utilizing mesoscopic structures known 
as “quantum dots” or “nano-rods.” These are 
examples of strategies by which one may even-
tually overcome technological barriers to the
production of the efficient devices in Region III 
(Fig. 11) required for large-scale applications.
In addition to PV, and following a less effi-
cient route, field experience is being gathered 
with several thermal solar power plants in the 
U.S. and Europe. Examples are the Solar 
One/Two plant in the Mojave Desert near Bars-
tow/CA (Fanchi, 2006) and a new plant in Alme-
ria/Spain. Here solar radiation is intercepted by 
helio-static mirrors and focused on a receiver 
atop a tower. The steam generated is used to 
drive a turbine. Variations of the principle use 
molten nitrate salt as heat transfer and storage 
fluid. 
There are no clear indications that the effi-
ciency of this latter technology could be raised 
much beyond its presently achieved maximum 
of 15%. Intermittency, energy storage, and grid 
feed-in problems discussed earlier for other 
methods hamper this and all solar energy tech-
nologies. In summary, solar energy technologies 
need to be improved significantly, before they 
can be considered a reliable primary energy re-
source. However, in principle, solar energy gen-
eration appears to have a great potential and 
poses new and scientifically interesting ques-
tions, justifying sustained R&D support.
In summary, one has to conclude that there 
is currently no technology available to resolve 
the main Strategic Issues afflicting renewable 
energy, although certain avenues promise 
progress in future decades. These conclusions
about renewables, together with the realization
that oil and gas reserves are finite and that their 
exploitation may adversely influence the global 
climate, have rekindled interest in nuclear pow-
er as a viable, long-term primary energy tech-
nology with a small “carbon footprint.” Argu-
ments have been given previously for the utili-
zation of remaining coal reserves for purposes 
other than electricity generation and a corres-
ponding ramping up of nuclear power for elec-
tricity. 
 
Potential and Risk Assessment: Nuclear
Energy 
Nuclear transmutation is the most energet-
ic process known. It is also ubiquitous, it fuels 
stars like the Sun, drives the evolution of the
universe, and has numerous applications, from 
energy production to diagnostics and therapy in 
medicine. The process is essentially a rear-
rangement of the nucleons of a system of one 
or two initial atomic nuclei into the final prod-
uct nuclei which have different average bonding 
strengths between the constituent nucleons 
(neutrons and protons) and can carry intrinsic 
excitation,
1 1 1 2 2 2
3 3 3 4 4 4
5A (N ,Z ) A (N ,Z )
A (N ,Z ) A (N ,Z ) Q
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Here, i iA ,N , and iZ are mass, neutron, and 
atomic numbers of the respective nuclei. Inter-
mediate, transition-state nuclei have been left 
unspecified in Equ. 5. The quantity Q is the 
energy release in the process, which is exo-
thermic (Q > 0), if the products of the reaction 
(5) are more tightly bound than the initial nuc-
lei. 
The average binding energy per nucleon 
(B/A) is plotted in Fig. 12 vs. the mass number A 
of each nucleus. Since iron (Fe) and nickel (Ni) 
are the most tightly bound, most stable nuclei, 
both aggregation (fusion) and disintegration 
(fission, spallation) release substantial amounts 
of energy when they proceed into the respec-
tive directions nearer to iron/nickel-like product 
nuclei. Therefore, both types of nuclear process
can be utilized to generate energy. The interest-
ing but technologically extremely challenging 
route of energy production by the fusion reac-
tion of deuterium (2H) with tritium (3H) will not 
be discussed here.
The most common process exploited in nuc-
lear power reactors is fission of uranium in-
duced by “thermal” neutrons. Here, a low-
energy (En ˜ 25 meV) neutron is captured by a 
nucleus of the rare (0.7% abundance) isotope
235U, producing an excited 236U nucleus. The lat-
ter then splits into two massive fission frag-
ments and 2 or 3 energetic (MeV) neutrons. A 
typical fission reaction is
 
235 236 147 87 2thn U U* La Br n +Q     (6)
where the energy gain is Q˜ 170 MeV. Each of 
the two new fission neutrons is “fast.” If slowed 
down sufficiently in a moderator medium, they 
can in turn be captured with very high probabil-
ity by a 235U nucleus and induce secondary fis-
sion reactions. Moderating medium in pressu-
rized-water (PWR) or boiling-water (BWR) reac-
tors is typically light water (H2O), but heavy wa-
ter (D2O) or graphite is also used. The former
(D2O) moderator is hallmark of an intelligently 
designed Canadian reactor type (CANDU), which 
runs on natural uranium. 
A fission chain reaction is generated and sus-
tained in a reactor, if per fission reaction at 
least one (k 1) neutron remains within the 
reactor core, is “thermalized” by the moderator
and available for capture. Introducing materials 
like cadmium (Cd) into the reactor makes it 
“sub-critical,” diverting neutrons from being 
captured by uranium, which extinguishes the 
fission chain reaction (k < 1). By partially insert-
ing Cd rods into the core, the fission chain reac-
tion can be controlled and finely tuned. The 
buildup of fission products in the reactor core 
and the disappearance of fissile 235U have a sim-
ilar effect, eventually extinguishing the chain 
reaction automatically. This requires refueling 
with fresh or reprocessed fuel.
The more abundant (99.3%) 238U isotope can 
also capture thermal neutrons but does not di-
rectly fission in the process. Therefore, conven-
tional fission reactors use fuels enriched to app. 
5% in 235U. Fission of 238U can be induced by 
fast-spectrum neutrons with energies higher 
than En = 1MeV. On the other hand, thermal-
neutron capture by the “fertile” isotope 238U 
leads to a “breeding” of the fissile isotope 239Pu, 
via the chain 
               
238 239 239decay
thn U U Pu
         
(7)
In this fashion, the burning of 235U fuel in a reac-
tor produces more nuclear fuel, the highly fissile 
plutonium 239Pu and, by subsequent neutron 
capture, also the non-fissile 240Pu. However, it 
may take years with such a U-Pu breeding 
process to produce amounts sufficient to load a 
reactor. The plutonium 239Pu fuel “bred” early 
Figure 12: The specific nuclear binding energy B/ A per 
nucleon vs. mass number (A). The box indicates the 
most stable Fe/Ni region.
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by the above process from relatively fresh fuel 
could chemically be separated and in principle 
be used to produce high-yield nuclear weapons.
Longer (>1 year) residence of the fuel in the 
reactor core produces an isotope mix unsuita-
ble for weapons. Materials produced by a
breeder reactor running on Th/U (oxides) fuel
are even less amenable to such diversion. Here 
232Th is the initial fertile isotope, and 233U is the 
fissile product isotope. Small admixtures of natU 
to the main Th component render the uranium
isotopic mix unsuitable for nuclear weapons but 
also produce small amounts of 239Pu. If exposed 
to thermal neutrons for sufficiently long time, 
long-lived transactinide isotopes are bred from 
the initial reactor load, for example, neptunium 
(Np), americium (Am), and curium (Cm). The 
Th/U cycle also works with fast neutrons.
Albeit with lower probabilities, reactions in-
duced by high-energy ( 1-GeV) protons, deli-
vered to the reactor core by an external accele-
rator, also induce fission of heavy nuclei like 
lead (Pb) and bismuth (Bi), thorium (Th), all iso-
topes of uranium and other actinides (Tish-
chenko, 2005). For example, fission reactions of 
the type
 
    
209 95 1001 14p( GeV) Bi Sr Pd n Q
      
(8)
     
occur, but with probabilities of only 10-25%, 
compared to 95% for thermal-neutron induced 
fission of 235U or 239Pu. However, a number of 
other processes such as
  
235 132 821 9 20p( GeV) U Te Ge p n Q (9)
involving many energetic neutrons and other 
light particles make up a larger fraction of the 
total reaction probability. These fast particles 
produce further exothermic reactions in the 
reactor and help sustaining a chain reaction.
Such accelerator driven nuclear reactor sys-
tems (ADS) could be considered the nuclear 
equivalent of a Diesel engine, which is able to 
produce energy from a multitude of fuels, in-
cluding “spent” nuclear fuel elements
(“waste”). Although a proof of principle has al-
ready been given (Andriamonge, 1995), other 
ADS test experiments are ongoing. Regardless 
of their detailed outcome, immediate applica-
bility of the ADS concept with uranium (or tho-
rium/uranium) reactors is based on the impor-
tant fact that per spallation reaction on average 
a large number (<Mn> ˜ 25-30 for Bi-U) of fast 
neutrons plus a significant number of other light 
particles (p, d, t, He,..) is emitted (Herbach, 
2006). Without the external particle beam, 
reactions in the subcritical (k˜ 0.9) reactor do 
not take place. The large neutron multiplicity
can also be used effectively in subcritical breed-
er and transmutation reactors discussed further 
below. The technology is essentially ready to be 
used.
The energy balance Q in a conventional reac-
tor is highly positive: The fission of the nuclei 
contained in a single gram of uranium reactor 
fuel (3.5% enriched in 236U), into two massive 
fission fragments and 2-3 neutrons produces as 
much energy as the burning of 200 kg of coal, 
or 10,000 L of crude oil, or 73 kg of natural gas
(LNG). The nuclear process energy is set free in 
form of kinetic energy of fission fragments, oth-
er charged particles (alpha particles), and
prompt and delayed neutrons. Another 20 MeV
of energy is delivered as electrons (“betas”) and 
in form of electromagnetic radiation ( -rays and 
X rays) in a “delayed” fashion through the beta 
decay of the fission products.
Like other power plants discussed earlier, a 
modern nuclear reactor is still basically a classic 
heat engine with a Carnot-type efficiency de-
Figure 13: Schematic of a nuclear fission reactor. The con-
tainment building houses reactor, primary cooling loop 
and steam generator. 
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pending on the difference between operating 
and exhaust temperatures (cf. Equ. 3). Since the 
fission products dissipate their kinetic energy 
within the reactor core, the core heats up. The 
heat generated in the process is transferred by 
a cooling medium to a primary heat exchanger 
and to a steam generator. The steam is directed
by pipes to the outside, where it drives a tur-
bine and electric generator. Spent fuel contains, 
as radioactive “waste,” long-lived fission prod-
ucts (FP) and newly formed actinide materials, 
which still contain recoverable nuclear energy 
that remains unused in current reactors.
Figure 13 shows the schematics of a pressu-
rized water cooled nuclear (PWR) reactor. For 
safety reasons, in all Western designs, the reac-
tor vessel, the primary cooling loop, and the 
steam generator are housed in a primary con-
tainment surrounded by a larger, secondary 
containment building, a massive structure made 
of several-feet thick armored concrete. The 
Russian RBMK-1000 reactor at Chernobyl did 
not have such a containment structure. Howev-
er, following the accident, Russian nuclear 
plants have also been upgraded accordingly.
The scheme of energy generation from 
thermal-neutron induced fission of uranium de-
scribed above is used by all 443 commercial 
nuclear power reactors operating presently in 
31 countries around the world at a power out-
put of 365 GW. Thorium is going to be the fuel 
for a new generation of reactors introduced in 
India. The number of countries considering nuc-
lear power for electricity is growing, and an es-
timated 1,000 reactors are expected (Deutch, 
2003) to be on grid by mid century. Of the order 
of 50 new reactors are now in the planning 
stage, 18 of them to be constructed in the U.S. 
For example, in June 2007, the Toshiba Corpo-
ration received an order for two 1.3-GW ad-
vanced boiling water reactors to be built in 
Houston, TX, for a total of US$ 4.86 B (CNN, 
2007). However, most of the nuclear plants
were built in the 1980s and 90s. Over the past 
decade, their efficiency has reached well over 
90% of capacity. The 100 GWe of power gener-
ated by the 104 U.S. nuclear reactors accounts
for 20% of the electricity consumed in the coun-
try. The corresponding number for France is 
78%. 
Susceptibility by the public to popular argu-
ments against nuclear power is largely influ-
enced by the perceived similarity to nuclear 
weapons and by the prevailing depth of under-
standing radiation. It is generally not fully ap-
preciated that natural radioactivity has an im-
portant role to play in the evolution of life in 
the universe. The process releasing nuclear 
energy occurs also in nature as a result of the 
decay of unstable nuclei that have either been
produced by cosmic rays in the atmosphere, or 
contained in rock, water, as well as in biological 
materials such as human tissue, bones, body 
fat, etc. The quantum mechanical tunnel effect 
is responsible for the sometimes extremely long 
delays (“ life times”) after which unstable nuclei 
decay “spontaneously” by emitting ionizing rad-
iation. 
On the other hand, the existence of adverse 
effects of ionizing radiation on biological tissue 
has been widely publicized, first during the 
1950s, in the context of nuclear weapons. Ma-
jor biological effects of radiation are similar to 
those of many chemicals. Both produce in the 
cells of biological tissues highly reactive organic 
molecules (radicals) that can attack cell DNA, 
induce mutations and, in the limit of high doses, 
cause cell death. However, unlike chemicals, 
particle and gamma radiation can be highly pe-
netrating and damaging to tissue because of 
energy dissipation at depth.
Human radiation exposure is 85% due to 
natural sources (Lilley, 2001), with medical di-
agnostics and treatments causing most of the 
remainder (14%). Fallout from the 1950s bomb 
tests and the nuclear industry contribute a 
small fraction of one percent to the average 
dose. As pointed out previously, more signifi-
cant than the latter and releases from the nuc-
lear industry are amounts of airborne radioac-
tive materials emitted in the combustion of 
coal.
Nevertheless, for a large part of the 20th cen-
tury, public attitude toward nuclear power has 
been positive. Changes during the 1970s and 
80s were induced by reactor incidents and polit-
ical activism, as well as supported by competing 
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commercial interest. In 1979, malfunction of 
one of the reactors at the U.S. Three Mile Island 
(TMI) nuclear plant led to a partial core melt-
down. Radioactivity was safely captured by the 
double-shell containment building, and no one 
was harmed. A reactor accident at Cher-
nobyl/Ukraine in 1986 resulted in 45 fatalities 
and displaced some 116,000 people living in a 
30-km radius of the reactor. It also produced a 
radioactive fallout plume over Europe, but for-
tunately caused no further proven fatalities, al-
though some studies have predicted illness, re-
duction in life quality and life expectancy for 
thousands more (Chernousenko, 1991, WHO, 
1999). It is important to emphasize that an ac-
cident of this severity was never physically poss-
ible with reactors of Western design.
These events contributed to an erosion of 
the previously strong public support for nuclear 
power in the U.S. and several European coun-
tries. But, as a positive consequence of the un-
fortunate accidents, reactor safety require-
ments were increased to an extent that the 
safety record of nuclear power plants now 
represents a stellar example for all industries. 
On the other hand, to obtain the several indi-
vidual licenses needed for construction, com-
missioning, and operation of power plants was
turned into a difficult, costly, and protracted
bureaucratic process whose eventual outcome 
was not always predictable. These regulatory 
facts contributed to long planning/construction 
periods and large cost overruns for nuclear 
power plants. More importantly, the global glut 
of cheap oil and gas during the past decades has 
made nuclear power, like coal, economically 
less competitive and less attractive. 
To effectively develop and expand the nuc-
lear energy option in the mid to long term, and
to an extent that will enjoy public acceptance 
and support, several Strategic Issues associated 
with the technology have to be addressed.
These issues include environmental hazards but 
are not limited to them. Concerns voiced in 
public discourse relate to conventional nuclear 
power using thermal-neutron induced fission of 
235U, specifically
A. Operational reactor safety;
B. Resource limits of nuclear fuel (235U/Pu);
 
C. Safe capture, storage and (eventual) se-
questration of radiotoxic nuclear waste;
D. Prevention of proliferation of nuclear ma-
terials that can be used for weapons;
E. Economy of nuclear energy.
The discussion below attempts to summarize 
the set of presently available answers to these 
strategic issues and give an outlook to the fu-
ture discovery potential. The discussion will 
demonstrate that the issues have already been, 
or can be, resolved in present technology or in 
technology “around the corner.” A positive role 
is played by a new Global Nuclear Energy Part-
nership (GNEP, 2006). The international GNEP 
effort includes the U.S., but not as the main 
technological driving force, a role that the U.S. 
has given up voluntarily in the 1970s and 80s. 
GNEP will promote standardized, modular, ad-
vanced reactor designs minimizing radioactive 
waste and the development of safe fuel cycles.
Several of the new reactor alternatives are 
based on well understood science and engi-
neering and none appear to face technological 
barriers. 
There is still important engineering R&D to 
be accomplished and remaining challenges are 
left to basic nuclear science (physics and chemi-
stry). The U.S. Nuclear Energy Research Institute 
(NERI) established in 1999 has been engaged 
mainly in advancing nuclear reactor technology 
in the U.S. But in principle, it supports also fun-
damental nuclear science. Currently 36 R&D 
projects by nuclear engineering departments 
are sponsored by NERI (DOE-NERI, 2006).
A. Reactor safety
As indicated previously, following the TMI 
incident and the Chernobyl accident, stricter 
regulations were imposed in the U.S. and else-
where on reactor design, reactor operational 
safety, and operationsmanagement. The causes 
for these easily preventable reactor accidents
have been investigated and are well unders-
tood. Underlying design flaws have been reme-
died by modification of existing plants and have 
been avoided in new designs for all now existing 
or planned reactors for the U.S., Europe, and 
Asia. The maximum credible accident (MCA) 
admitted by the new rules is much less severe 
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than even a partial, TMI-type core meltdown
with no radiation release to the outside. With 
the experience of the most recent 8,000 world-
wide reactor-years, the nuclear power industry 
is now recognized as the safest of all major in-
dustries. These measures have rendered Stra-
tegic Issue A in the above list of five such issues 
as resolved. Nevertheless, future nuclear reac-
tors will intrinsically be even safer. They will 
feature fail-safe operation through a negative 
reactivity factor, a passive emergency cooling 
system, advanced fuel element designs, etc. 
The evolution in time of nuclear reactors is 
illustrated in Fig. 14 in terms of design catego-
ries defined by the U.S. DOE.
 
Many of the earli-
est Generation I (Gen I) plants are still in opera-
tion, while the bulk of the presently operating 
(Gen II) light-water reactors (LWR) were built in 
the 1980s and 90s. Generation III reactors are 
conceptually similar to Gen. II reactors but fea-
ture enhanced safety. Some countries such as 
South Africa and China are pursuing more ad-
vanced "Gen. III+" designs such as the Modular 
Pebble Bed Reactor (MPBR). India has commis-
sioned a nuclear reactor utilizing thorium (Th),
rather than uranium, as primary nuclear fuel, a 
strategy that could further defuse several of the 
Strategic Issues associated with nuclear energy. 
The country is building an entire new nuclear 
power industry upon this principle.
Within the GNEP framework, the U.S. con-
siders longer-term (next 20 years) several, eco-
nomical Gen. IV designs (DOE-GIF, 2002), to be 
thoroughly studied, modelled (computationally 
simulated) and tested:
Very high-temperature reactors (VHTR)
Sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR)
Reactors cooled by (thermodynamically) 
supercritical water (SCWR)
Lead-cooled fast reactors (LFR)
Gas-cooled fast reactors (GFR)
Molten-salt reactors (MSR)
These new reactor types promise more reli-
able operation, minimization of accident conse-
quences, and improved accident management 
on site. It is plausible that these goals will be
achieved by smart, inherent safety features that 
rely only on natural forces (e.g., gravity) and
“can be understood by nonexperts” (DOE-GIF, 
2002). These features include a robust and reli-
able control of reactivity (k) and fast heat re-
moval from the reactor core, if necessary. A 
crucial technical factor is a long thermal re-
sponse time which will make runaway proc-
esses such as occurred at TMI and Chernobyl 
essentially impossible. Because of the hermetic 
enclosure of the reactor vessel within several 
massive containment shells and a separation of 
primary from secondary cooling loops, all new 
reactor types promise effective capture of all 
radioactive waste, including gases (Kr, Xe, etc.) 
produced in fission. 
The fast (fast-spectrum) reactors in the 
above list are “breeders.” They are all based on 
fission of natural uranium and of the successor 
materials bred in fast neutron reactions. Here,
Figure 14: Timeline for evolving reactor generations Gen I – Gen IV characterized by improved operational and prolifera-
tion safety at reduced waste,  In some countries, Gen III+ reactors are already under construction, ahead of this schedule 
(Adapted from DOE-Gif.) 
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both isotopes, 235U and 238U, are reacted with 
energetic neutrons, releasing its entire nuclear 
energy potential. Thorium/uranium mix is an in-
teresting alternative breeder fuel (David, 2007). 
Since the process is induced by fast neutrons, it
does not require a moderator. The “top-
ranked” (DOE-GIF, 2002) LFR can be configured 
as an assembly of prefabricated reactor mod-
ules rated at 300-400 MWe. The small individual 
cores have a long lifetime of 10-30 years. The 
LFR safety is enhanced through its use of a very 
inert, lead or a lead/bismuth (Pb/Bi) eutectic 
coolant, which is liquid under normal opera-
tional conditions. The LFR has a closed fuel cycle 
and allows for efficient actinide management
(see section below). This project is not yet pur-
sued in the U.S. where the development of a 
helium-cooled VHTR has higher priority. 
The VHTR project connects to a successful 
series of experimental reactor tests carried out 
between 1966 and 1988 in Germany (AVR and
KFZ Jülich Pebble Bed Reactors) and the current 
modular developments in Pretoria/South Africa 
(PBMR). A “Pebble Bed” reactor is operated at
core temperatures near 10000C, or above, and 
at pressures of up to 9 MPa. The uranium fuel 
consists of uranium oxide (UO2) particles coated 
with silicon carbide enclosed in tennis-ball sized 
graphite spheres. A typical load would contain 
450,000 of these pebbles. The reactor core con-
cept has been tested successfully in the 21-year 
operations of the AVR reactor.
 
Even though operating temperatures are 
high in a PBR, its power density is 30 times 
lower than in a conventional reactor. The PBR 
demonstrates an example of an intrinsically fail-
safe system that cannot be circumvented by 
human intervention: The ratio of surface area to 
volume of the fuel elements (pebbles) in the 
core is so large that heat is emitted through the 
surface much faster than can be produced by 
the fission fragments in the fuel. Therefore, 
heat build-up damaging the fuel elements 
(“melt-down”) cannot occur, regardless of the 
presence or state of the coolant. The reactor 
has a strongly negative coefficient of reactivity.
  Major goals of the VHTR project (see Fig. 
15) are to develop by 2020 a reactor able to 
produce simultaneously both electricity and hy-
drogen by thermo-chemical dissociation. How 
important the latter capacity will be remains to 
be seen. The economic prospects of a “hydro-
gen economy” have been critically discussed by 
Romm (Romm, 2005) and Smil (Smil, 2005). In 
the context of reactor safety, it is mentioned 
here that the new class of subcritical, accelera-
tor driven systems, which are currently not pur-
sued in the U.S. are inherently incapable of 
meltdown. Furthermore, “breeder reactors” 
producing nuclear fuels from fertile isotopes are 
in their safety features identical to those of the 
underlying functional scheme of the host de-
sign.    
The sodium (Na)-cooled fast reactor (SFR) is 
a system developed in the U.S. as a prime can-
didate for a “burner” or “ incinerator” reactor 
for the high-level waste management. This type, 
which uses a closed fuel cycle, has already been 
built and operated safely in the U.S., Japan, 
France, Germany, Russia and other countries. 
The reactor derives its specific safety feature 
from the fact that the un-pressurized metal 
coolant has a large thermal inertia. Its boiling 
point is 8830C, and the core typically runs at 
about 5000C. There are two sequential Na cool-
ing cycles, such that a potential reaction of Na 
with external water does not involve radioac-
tive Na. The reactor can run on uranium-
plutonium mixed-oxide UPuO2 (MOX) fuel, on 
the waste from conventional reactors, or on a 
U/Pu-zirconium alloy, which would be difficult 
to convert into weapons material. In these and 
all reactor types considered by the GNEP initia-
tive, reactor safety plays a most important role.
B. Resource limits of nuclear fuel
Figure 15: VHTR concept with (left to right) reactor ves-
sel with graphite core and reflector, heat exchanger, 
and on-site hydrogen plant. (From DOE-GIF, 2002)
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Like fossil fuels, nuclear fuel is a finite re-
source. About 10,000 t of uranium is used per 
year to produce electricity. Uranium is found 
mainly in Australia, Kazakhstan, Canada (Cigar 
Lake), the U.S., also in Africa (South Africa, Ni-
ger, Gabon, Namibia). In the U.S. uranium 
mines are in Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, New 
Mexico, and Texas. Presently, economically re-
coverable uranium reserves amount to ap-
proximately 4.7 Mt (IAEA, 2005). This supply 
can satisfy demand by conventional, wastefully 
inefficient, nuclear reactors for 50-100 years 
(Herbst & Hopley, 2007, Nifenecker, 2003), 
while new “smarter” breeder reactors would 
run on the same fuel for more than a thousand 
years. Following the present scenario of rising 
uranium prices, more uranium resources will be
exploited. This already includes the reopening 
of mines and the mining of ore with poor ura-
nium concentration. In future it could include 
seabed mining and uranium recovery from coal.   
Uranium is extracted chemically from the 
mined uranium ore and converted, first to U3O8
oxide (“yellow cake”) and then to uranium 
hexa-fluoride (UF6). The latter is used in gas dif-
fusers or centrifuges to enrich the gas stream in 
235UF6, which finally reaches 3-5% enrichment in 
its 235U component. An important alternative is 
the mixed-oxide MOX fuel produced by blend-
ing or during a recycling process. 
At present, mined uranium is needed in the 
U.S. only to provide 55% of the needed primary 
reactor fuel. The rest comes from decommis-
sioned nuclear weapons stockpiles, which is 
highly enriched material that can be blended in 
with natural uranium or thorium. Approxi-
mately 174 t of weapons-grade uranium have
been made available for the civilian sector, 30 t 
have been used already, about 10% of the 
global demand (Herbst & Hopley, 2007). Fuel 
from this resource will continue to be available 
for some time. This fact has an influence on the 
economy of nuclear energy in the U.S. Thorium
232Th is an interesting alternative fuel, which is 
also more abundant than uranium.
For a sustainable, long-term development 
of nuclear power in the U.S., it is necessary to 
abolish the current, wasteful “once-through” 
practice of using only the rare uranium isotope 
Figure 16: Aqueous nuclear fuel re-
processing scheme. Spent fuel rods 
are cut open and the contents are
dissolved chemically. An isotopic 
separator provides different 
streams for uranium, actinides and 
fission products. Uranium and plu-
tonium are recast into fuel elements 
for another cycle of reactor opera-
tion. Fission products and some 
transactinides are vitrified and 
stored in a long-term depository. 
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235U (0.7% abundance) as fuel, and only a frac-
tion at that. The once-through method pro-
duces relatively significant amounts of high-
level radioactive waste while leaving 99.3% of 
the energy content of the natural uranium un-
tapped. Instead, in the GNEP a closed fuel cycle 
such as illustrated in Fig. 16 will be adopted, 
where the “spent” fuel is chemically reproc-
essed, recovering in the so-called UREX, UREX+,
or PUREX processes the uranium or the com-
bined uranium/plutonium isotopes that re-
mained after a long run or were “bred” in the 
preceding cycle. In these repeatable processes, 
fission products, which can act as reactor “poi-
son” and perhaps some long-lived transuranium 
isotopes are removed from the reusable fuel 
elements. If fuel is recycled for use in a fast 
(“Burner”) reactor, transuranium isotopes are 
left in the fuel to undergo transmutation inside 
the reactor while producing energy. 
Depending on the new (Gen IV) reactor type 
considered, different reprocessing methods are 
employed. For example, an aqueous process is 
preferred for the spent fuel from an SFR or an 
LWR working with MOX fuel, while pyro-
processing is the method of choice of that reac-
tor when loaded with metallic fuel (DOE-GIF, 
2002). The former type of reprocessing/ recy-
cling process is well known from many years of 
experience in other countries. However, to en-
hance the economy and reduce the ecological 
impact of this reprocessing method, further 
R&D is desirable. The pyro process has been 
employed in the past, but several steps in an 
advanced version are still under active devel-
opment. 
Many countries such as the U.K., France, 
Russia, and India have applied nuclear fuel re-
processing in a closed fuel cycle, safely and for a 
long time (the U.K. since the 1950s). France and 
Russia provide the service commercially to 
other countries such as Japan and Germany. 
Present annual capacity of reprocessing plants 
is approximately 5,000 tons. An environmental 
concern relates to undesirable consequences of 
fuel reprocessing, accumulating high-level ra-
dioactive waste that has to be managed. In the 
1970s, the U.S. adopted a non-reprocessing pol-
icy and closed down its reprocessing plants. The 
intended change to a closed-fuel cycle nuclear 
industry now requires technology import from 
European countries and/or India, specifically for 
reconstituting lost expertise in nuclear and ra-
diation chemistry.
Obviously, technologically well understood 
fuel breeding, reprocessing and recycling ex-
tend the time span of available nuclear energy 
for thousands of years at present energy de-
mand levels. This estimate does not even ac-
count for the thorium (Th) fuel which is (~4x) 
more abundant in the earth’s crust than ura-
nium and would in several respects represent a 
more desirable fuel technology. In any case, the 
ample fuel resources available already with pre-
sent technologies make nuclear energy the 
prime candidate for a major component of a 
long-term energy strategy. Strategic Issue B has 
been resolved.
 
C. Radiotoxic waste management
A major argument leveled often against the 
use of nuclear power is the fact that the opera-
tion of conventional nuclear power plants pro-
duces copious amounts of high- and low-level 
radiotoxic materials as byproducts of the fis-
sion/breeding process. These trace materials 
Figure 17: Radio toxicity vs. time after shutdown, of 
spent fuel from a pressurized water uranium reactor 
(PWR), from a U/ Pu breeder, and from the Th/ U fuel 
cycle. FP indicates the faster decay of fission products. 
From (David, 2007)
 29Energy Strategy
contaminate (~1% of total) the “spent” 
235U/238U fuel elements that are presently 
stored on site at most nuclear plants.
 
The radioactivity of fuel rods freshly re-
moved from a core is essentially due to fission 
products (FP). Due to their short half lives, this 
activity disappears within 6 months (Stacey, 
2001).During the first three years after removal 
from the reactor core, spent fuel elements are 
intensively radio-toxic (Fig. 17), such that they 
are kept in water pools to “cool.” After that, 
passive cooling in dry storage is appropriate 
(APS, 2007). The corresponding volume is not 
large (2 m3 per 1-GW reactor each year). An 
amount of 54,000 tons of spent fuel rods has 
accumulated so far on the world’s reactor sites.
The “waste” would physically fit into one corner 
of a large U.S. commercial warehouse for con-
sumer goods, although such a concentration 
would be inadvisable.
The fission byproducts of nuclear power 
generation release energy in form of alpha, be-
ta and gamma rays for extended periods of 
time. The former particles are examples of di-
rectly ionizing radiation of the type acting in 
nuclear batteries. Until large-scale, economic 
applications for these secondary energy sources 
are found, the materials are considered unde-
sirable and dangerous. Funds have been col-
lected by the U.S. federal government from 
mandatory fees of 0.1 cent imposed on every 
kWh of nuclear generated electricity, contribut-
ing approximately US$ 1 B/year to a fund dedi-
cated to the development of a geological nuc-
lear waste repository in the country. 
In the terminology of the energy sector, un-
like the waste of fossil fuel power plants, nuc-
lear waste has always been captured and most-
ly stored on site. But the material has not yet 
been sequestered in a permanent geological 
repository such as in salt domes or geologically 
stable rock formations. In the U.S. this latter 
possibility has been discussed and developed 
over a span of many years, until very recently 
(2007) the Yucca Mountain site in New Mexico 
was designated the first official permanent nuc-
lear waste repository, to open in 2010. The site 
choice and details of environmental engineering 
study and selection process have become con-
tentious political issues. In addition, concerns 
for the safety of transporting nuclear waste are 
often raised, even though the safety of the 
thousands of past shipments moving 3,500 tons 
of waste through the U.S. has been docu-
mented (NAS, 2006). 
It has been argued earlier in this article 
that, in fact, there is no convincing evidence for 
the soundness of predictions of a geological 
safety of any such repository over periods of 
millennia or even centuries. In addition, what 
qualifies as waste now may (likely) have value in 
future. Therefore, it appears to be prudent to 
design repositories such that they allow for a 
maximum of flexibility in dealing with the 
stored waste at any time in the future, including 
extraction and relocation, recovery and repack-
aging. 
The basic waste removal problem faced by 
the nuclear industry applies also to the fossil 
fuel energy sector, which has mounted carbon 
sequestration efforts. However, the corres-
ponding problems for nuclear energy are differ-
ent and somewhat less severe:
The radio-toxicity of nuclear waste disap-
pears in time. 
There is no known positive feedback effect 
that could generate a runaway situation 
similar to what has been postulated for 
climatic influences of GHG emissions. 
Radioactive waste is immobile, since it is 
mostly in solid (vitrified) and less in liquid 
Figure 18: Artist’s view of underground waste deposi-
tory showing service buildings and shafts, and storage 
caverns.
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form, while gas components rare and 
mostly short-lived. 
Any long-term discharge from a repository 
would affect area and population of limited 
sizes.
Lastly, a new policy of reprocessing nuclear 
fuel reduces considerably the demand for sto-
rage space, decreasing the required residence 
time by several orders of magnitude (see Fig. 
17). 
The main tasks in nuclear waste manage-
ment is to separate radio-chemically the reusa-
ble U or U/Pu fuel stock from fission products 
(FP) and all, or some, of the transactinides pro-
duced in multiple neutron captures. To effec-
tively transmute these products, for example by 
neutron irradiation, requires prior element se-
paration. Target for removal are the relatively 
long-lived fission products 99Tc (t1/2 ˜ 2·105
years) and 129I (t1/2 ˜ 1.6·107 years). The gamma 
emitting FPs 90Sr and 137Cs decay both with t1/2
˜ 30 years. The long-term activity of spent fuel is 
dominated by 240Pu and the “minor actinides” 
(MA) Am, Np, and Cm. While effective commer-
cial separation techniques are available for Pu, 
such methods have still to be devised by radio-
chemists (Stacey, 2001). As illustrated in Fig. 17, 
the effect of these actinides can be reduced 
significantly, down to 0.5% of the initial activity,
by their recycling as fuel in fast (“Burner”) reac-
tors of the SFR type planned in the GNEP initia-
tive.
Invoking the Th/U breeder fuel cycle would 
essentially defuse the nuclear waste problem. 
As demonstrated by the radio-toxicity data 
shown in Fig. 17 (David, 2007), radioactivity le-
vels of reprocessed fuel due to transactinides 
from the Th/U cycle reduce within less than 
one hundred years to a level approached by 
waste from conventional (PWR) reactors only 
after a million years. Its radio-toxicity decays 
within similarly short time scales similar to 
those of fission products (FP) as illustrated in 
Fig. 17. This is clearly an attractive feature of 
the Th/U fuel cycle employed by the Indian 
nuclear energy program (Dey & Bansal, 2006; 
Sinha & Kakadkar, 2006). It should justify simi-
lar considerations of this fuel cycle elsewhere.
In summary, the need for long-term geologi-
cal deposition of some nuclear waste has not 
disappeared and will remain for all considered 
nuclear fuel cycles. However, its severity is sig-
nificantly smaller than typically assumed by the 
public and compares favorably with the envi-
ronmental hazards accepted by other seg-
ments of the energy economy.  Strategic Issue 
C has thus lost much of its severity and urgen-
cy.
 
D. Proliferation safety
The potential for creating powerful nuclear 
weapons with relatively small amounts (~10 kg) 
of concentrated (95%) uranium (isotope 235U) or
plutonium (isotope 239Pu) adds a risk factor 
unique to the nuclear industry. Even a small re-
actor produces sufficient amounts of plutonium 
to manufacture several fission (“atomic”) 
bombs per year, albeit typically in a highly di-
luted isotope mix. However, to optimize the 
production of materials suitable for weaponiza-
tion, a reactor would have to be shut down, dis-
charged, refuelled, and restarted several times 
per year in a way quite obvious to external ob-
servers. Nevertheless, isotopically separated 
and recovered from reactor fuel, some of the
235U and 239Pu could be captured and diverted 
by non-government agents who then could 
produce a simple “home-made” nuclear device. 
Reprocessing spent nuclear fuels with cur-
rent reprocessing technologies requires the 
transfer of large amounts of Pu or enriched ma-
terials from reprocessing facilities to reactors. 
The risk of illicit interceptions of such materials 
in transit has conjured the spectre of a perilous 
“plutonium economy.” However, this risk could 
easily be reduced by collocating reprocessing 
laboratories with the nuclear reactor facilities
using the fuel. Given the potential of social un-
rest, a proposed alternative strategy of placing 
reprocessing plants only in those countries that 
are already fuel suppliers, is less convincing.
A proliferation-safe strategy adopts a fuel 
cycle that simply does not produce highly en-
riched nuclear fuels. In fact, several new reactor 
types mentioned earlier are designed for fuel 
types and reprocessing/ recycling techniques 
that are “proliferation-safe” in that they make 
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isolation and diversion of fissile materials ex-
tremely difficult, requiring access to a sophisti-
cated metallurgical national industry and infra-
structure. This result can be achieved in various 
ways that are under active consideration. For 
example, alloys instead of pure metals could be 
used as fuels. Already laboratory tested, the 
Uranium Extraction Plus (UREX+) reprocessing 
technique achieves these goals by keeping ura-
nium, plutonium and the minor actinides (Np, 
Am, Cm) together in the process. In this fashion, 
fuel enrichment levels are too low for weapons’ 
applications, greatly reducing the proliferation 
risks. As a side benefit, the actinides would be 
taken out of the waste stream and provide new
fuel, for example, for a “burner” reactor.  
It should also be recalled in this context that 
issues related to proliferation are much less se-
vere for the Th/U fuel cycle and accelerator 
driven subcritical (ADS) reactors. Isolating 
weapons grade fissile materials from spent 
Th/U fuel elements already requires sophisti-
cated remotely controlled radiochemistry, 
which is made unfeasible by natural uranium 
admixtures to the basic Th fuel. Both these po-
tential nuclear techniques are under study and 
development in several countries.
GNEP decisions about recommended future 
reactor types and the fuels they use are 
weighed heavily by assessments of the relative 
advantages of fuel reprocessing against the pro-
liferation risks. Because of the large number of 
countries that presently already conduct, or in-
tend to pursue, fuel reprocessing, combating 
nuclear proliferation remains a recognized in-
ternational safeguarding task with no patent so-
lutions. 
The proliferation risk is now understood to 
include the possibilities of “dirty” bombs, which 
could be designed to spread radioactive materi-
als over populated areas using conventional ex-
plosives. It should be noted that the materials 
that have been in storage for some time at re-
actor sites are not the preferred substances for 
such purpose. Because of the long half lives of 
the isotopes in spent fuel rods, the material is 
less radiotoxic. It would also be more readily 
cleaned up after an incident.
It is important to distinguish the narrow con-
cept of “proliferation” adopted here from its of-
ficial political definition, which includes the 
transfer and sharing of knowledge about nu-
clear energy technologies between legitimate 
governments of nation states. The narrower
definition recognizes that the denial of ad-
vanced technologies to entire nations by mo-
nopoly holding powers may be ethically unten-
able. History demonstrates that such attempts 
are also futile. Present international treaties 
notwithstanding, a number of nations, including 
Israel, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and 
Iran have gained access to nuclear energy tech-
nologies and have acquired the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons, thus enlarging the 
circle of nuclear powers significantly. Yet, in 
spite of much international tension and a num-
ber of armed conflicts, in 62 years, the U.S. has 
remained the only nation that has ever used 
nuclear weapons. Simply, a policy designed to 
maintain nuclear exclusivity among nation 
states has failed, but without disastrous conse-
quences…yet. A realistic view of international 
relations that acknowledges that fact would de-
criminalize, and even promote, a transparent
exchange of information pertaining to nuclear 
power between legitimate governments. 
Summarizing, one arrives at the conclusion 
that the nuclear proliferation risk, narrowly de-
fined as most people would understand and ac-
cept, has become very small, even with existing 
reprocessing technologies and with minimal in-
ternational surveillance (e.g., by the IAEA) of 
reactor operations. It promises to become es-
sentially eliminated by new technologies now 
explored in laboratory studies. Together with
answers to the questions discussed earlier, this 
conclusion also implies that an important Stra-
tegic Issue associated with nuclear energy could 
be considered nearly resolved, as far as tech-
nologically possible. What remains can be re-
solved by the political process. This is an impor-
tant fact that the public should be made aware 
of.
  
E. Economy of nuclear energy
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In previous sections, costs of electricity 
generated from different technologies have 
been discussed. For most applications, including 
nuclear power plants, comprehensive life cycle 
cost/benefit analyses are unavailable. In addi-
tion, these costs are time dependent. Capital 
and fuel, as well as collateral costs, are quanti-
ties that fluctuate strongly with supply and de-
mand, as well as with the exchange rates of the 
currencies involved. However, the costs of nuc-
lear and coal generated electricity are compa-
rable to each other (4-5 cents/kWh) and 
amount to about 10% of the costs of rene-
wables. In both cases, the “energy payback”
time (energy produced=energy spent in plant 
construction) is only a few months, compared 
to several years for renewables. Plant capital 
and operating costs are also comparable (be-
tween 3 and 5 cents/kWh). 
Costs for final sequestration/deposition of 
the waste are not well known, for either fossil 
or nuclear fuels. Some fee for waste disposal 
has already been applied to nuclear electricity.
With the adoption of closed fuel cycles, the pro-
jected amount of nuclear waste that will even-
tually have to be placed in a permanent deposi-
tory is reduced. New fuel is generated by repro-
cessing or “breeding.” This fact improves the 
cost situation further in favor of nuclear power. 
Furthermore, in the U.S. the availability of wea-
pons-grade uranium for civilian purposes re-
duces fuel costs at least during a decade. 
The costs of complete decommissioning of 
nuclear plants would certainly be expected to 
be higher than that of coal power plants and 
more in line with that of large chemical, refinery
or hydro-electric facilities. However, in the 
present and ongoing expansion phase, colloca-
tion of new nuclear reactors with existing sites 
will allow for a reuse of much of the technical 
infrastructure and plant already in place.
Economic considerations are important for 
the design of a sustainable energy strategy. But 
it has become common sentiment that they 
should not be the only or even the dominant 
ones. The specific additional collateral costs in 
human health and lives of different technolo-
gies are much more important but difficult to 
quantify. However, because of the absence of 
significant emission of airborne pollutants, toxic 
liquids, and GHGs, nuclear power is already now
“cleaner” than other energy technologies, be-
sides being economically competitive. This is no 
longer a Strategic Issue.
  
F. The future of nuclear energy research
As discussed above, the economy can rely 
on a set of already proven and tested nuclear 
energy technologies to support its ongoing ex-
pansion. This poses the question of whether 
nuclear science is a field that, after almost 70 
years, has already grown to maturity with little
significant potential left for scientific discovery
that could be of relevance to energy applica-
tions.
The answer to this query has to be that nuc-
lear science is evolving and expanding. It re-
mains relevant to a variety of applications, in-
cluding energy. Projects of basic science interest 
deal with fundamental processes of energy 
conversion, which should have a positive feed-
back on energy technology. 
Nuclear science has developed an under-
standing of basic properties of nuclei in the 
neighborhood of naturally occurring nuclei 
(“Valley of Beta-Stability”) and for low excita-
tions. But it is struggling to gain theoretical 
access to phenomena of the stability of nuclei
with unusual combinations of neutrons and 
protons (“ isospin”) (Li & Schröder, 2001) or of 
nuclei with high internal excitations. Their large-
amplitude fission-like motion and their interac-
tions remain topics of current research (Hof-
mann, 2007).
Even though it has been possible to parame-
terize and systematize large sets of nuclear data 
within a conventional theoretical framework, 
the difficulty to extrapolate to properties and 
interactions of weakly bound, exotic nuclei sug-
gests that some major pieces of the physics 
puzzle are still missing. To understand this phys-
ics well and quantitatively belongs to the prere-
quisites for the success of basic energy science 
in the future. It is of considerable interest for 
obtaining a better understanding of cosmologi-
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cal structures (neutron stars) and processes 
(supernovae) as well.
 
In fact, the fundamental 
role that the nucleus and nuclear phenomena 
play for an understanding of processes on mi-
croscopic or cosmological scales provides strong 
motivation for much of modern nuclear re-
search.
As an example of the importance of basic nuc-
lear research for future energy applications, one 
may consider (Fig. 19) the accelerator driven 
subcritical (ADS) nuclear reactor (Bowman 
1992, Rubbia, 1993, Andriamonge, 1995, Nife-
necker, 2003) which could also be used for 
transmutation of transactinides and fission 
products. In the basic process, a beam of high-
energy (1 GeV) projectiles, protons or neutrons, 
produced with an external accelerator is used 
to bombard the “target” material in the reactor 
core. The projectiles induce a chain of multiple 
successive (primary, secondary, ternary, etc.) 
spallation, fission, and evaporation reactions. As 
may be deduced from Fig. 12, the overall 
process is exothermic. This fact makes it inter-
esting for nuclear reactors that can be fuelled 
with a range of heavy materials including, but 
not limited to, mercury, lead, bismuth, thorium, 
uranium (“nuclear Diesel” reactor), where the 
lighter materials serve mainly as neutron gene-
rating “additives” to the fissile fuel base.    
Perhaps surprisingly, already the first two 
steps in the reaction sequence, the formation of 
a heavy target-like nucleus (target nucleus + 1 
projectile nucleon) and its decay pose formida-
ble, fundamental challenges to conventional 
nuclear reaction theory (Schröder & Huizenga, 
1984). The reaction reaches excitation energies 
of a few MeV per nucleon (mass unit), well be-
low the binding energy of approximately 8 MeV 
per nucleon (Fig. 12). The inability of theory to 
account for experimental observations of unex-
pected branching between evaporation, fission, 
and copious cluster emission in heavy-ion reac-
tions has opened a new direction of nuclear 
science research, the physics of nuclear phase 
transitions. The anomalies with respect to expe-
rimental systematics of multi-chance fission es-
tablished (Hilscher & Rossner, 1992) for lower 
excitations occur consistently (Tõke & Schröder, 
2006) in both heavy-ion (Schröder, 2003) and 
spallation (Goldenbaum, 2004, Tishchenko, 
2005) reactions. A satisfactory explanation for 
these processes will probably require a much 
better understanding of the diffuse surface 
(Tõke & Schröder, 2003) of excited nuclei than 
has been provided by contemporary nuclear 
physics. Hence the motivation and need for 
studies of the nuclear surface about which sur-
prisingly little is known.
To quote another example for a basic re-
search need, nuclear and radiation chemistry is 
challenged to provide a better understanding of 
the chemical processes that will make the mol-
ten-salt reactor (MSR) work, which is one of the 
elegant advanced nuclear reactor types fore-
seen by GNEP in the medium-term future. This 
system (see Fig. 20) uses a circulating molten 
salt mixture as fuel and coolant. For example, 
uranium, thorium, and actinide fluorides are 
Figure 19: Subcritical accelerator driven transmu-
ter/ burner reactor (Nuclear Diesel). The proton beam 
produces fast neutrons in a liquid lead target, which in-
duce transmutation and fission reactions in the reactor 
core proper.
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dissolved in a molten mix of sodium and zirco-
nium fluorides (NaF/ZrF4).
 
Whether or not this would actually be a pre-
ferred solution is subject to favorable chemical 
kinetics and thermodynamics of the molten salt 
mix. Solubility of actinides and fission fragments 
in the salt mix needs to be measured. Boundary 
conditions are given by the radiochemical re-
quirements of low neutron capture cross sec-
tions of the passive components and their 
transmutation in an intense neutron flux. 
In addition to basic nuclear science research 
of the type illustrated with the above examples, 
there is great need for new and more precise 
and detailed measurements of nuclear cross 
section data (Schroeder & Lusk, 2006). Corres-
pondingly, a more accurate nuclear reaction 
theory and large-scale computer simulations 
are needed. Such research is of importance for 
reactor systems such as fast-spectrum reactors 
considered in the GNEP project (DOE-GIF, 2002, 
Nifenecker, 2003, Aliberti, 2006). With second-
ary beams of exotic projectiles that have be-
come available, or are under development, in 
Japan, Europe, and in the U.S., one can now 
study interactions of the kind that fission or 
spallation products undergo in a reactor core.
 
Figure 20: Schematics of a molten-salt reactor.
The importance of new R&D in support of 
the GNEP initiative has been recognized by the 
corresponding government agencies. Already 
since 1999 a U.S. Nuclear Energy Research Initi-
ative (NERI) has supported nuclear engineering 
projects for Gen IV and the Advanced Fuel Cycle 
(AFC). NERI research partners in 2006 included 
36 U.S. university nuclear engineering depart-
ments, eight national laboratories, along with
several foreign organizations and private corpo-
rations. Founded in 2001, an international coo-
perate (I-NERI) supports joint nuclear energy re-
search in collaboration with Asian, European, 
South American and OECD countries.
Since more recently, the DOE sponsored 
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) encourag-
es the formation of collaborations between ba-
sic (physics and chemistry) and applied nuclear 
scientists and engineers, to find strategies for 
generating data and theoretical models of re-
levance to reactor of Gen IV and beyond.  Sup-
porting AFCI objectives are further several 
computer and engineering laboratories, all 
planned to take up operations within the next 
few years.
In the discussions of the goals and aspira-
tions of GNEP and other initiatives interested in 
nuclear technology, it has been recognized that
over the past several decades there has been a 
erosion in the number of nuclear science faculty 
and graduates at U.S. universities. This has led 
to a loss of global competitiveness in a funda-
mental science and technology which is of stra-
tegic importance for the future strength of the 
U.S. economy. 
Conclusions: Recommendations for a sus-
tainable energy future
The discussion of the previous sections has 
reiterated and commented on what is common-
ly known, namely that cheap oil and gas, the 
energy basis of the economies of Western indu-
strialized nations, are rapidly disappearing. It is 
uncertain exactly how many decades of their af-
fordable use remain. Certain is, however, that in 
the interim a replacement energy basis has to 
be found and adapted to an optimum extent to 
the requirements of modern economies. It is al-
so obvious that, in turn, economies have to 
adapt to the specifics of the available energy re-
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sources. Reduction of demand, albeit a “smart” 
way to mitigate the effect of an energy crisis, is 
not a complete and certainly not a global solu-
tion to, or a way to circumvent, the problem. A 
number of populous emerging nations will 
simply need to increase their energy consump-
tion, largely and necessarily based on fossil fuel 
technologies. On the other hand, major and 
sudden reductions in living standard would be 
difficult to establish in other nations. But the 
technologically advanced societies could be ex-
pected to realign their economies with nuclear 
and clean-coal electricity.
The remaining time afforded society by the 
currently still relatively low energy prices should 
be used to evaluate critically and realistically 
the available technological choices for energy 
futures, and then to develop vigorously the 
most potent technologies. The large numbers of 
government and privately sponsored research 
projects, as well as advertising efforts of a 
burgeoning new industry, assert that there are 
many attractive energy futures for the indu-
strialized nations. In fact, a comparative evalua-
tion of potential and risks of several primary 
energy technologies, such as attempted in this 
article, suggests otherwise. Several energy fu-
tures that at first appear attractive (“green”) 
and painless to implement do not actually live 
up to their promises or fulfill essential require-
ments that economies make on any sustainable 
energy basis.
 
Reliable primary energy generating tech-
nologies are based on the utilization of clean-
coal and advanced nuclear energy, neither of 
them first choices of the ecologically concerned. 
However, with these two technologies, existing 
economies can evolve smoothly by gradual 
extrapolation and improvement of their existing
infrastructures. The main criticisms against 
these technologies, as represented by the cor-
responding Strategic Issues, have already been,
or can be, addressed with existing methods. 
Required are public support and commitment 
to invest heavily in the future energy infrastruc-
ture. At the same time, it is important to con-
tinue the R&D of renewable and fusion energy 
technologies, which could play important roles 
in the longer term.
Any realistic strategic energy plan for a (rel-
atively) secure energy future would consider, 
among others, with priority the following set of 
specific RD&T recommendations:
Develop and Employ Clean Coal Technology:
Improve the safety of mining (robotics).
Enforce environmental restoration of 
mining sites.
Promote and subsidize clean coal (IGCC) 
technology. Eliminate airborne sulfuric, 
GHG, PM, and metal emissions.
Further develop, test, and construct 
modern FutureGen-type coal power 
plants, upgrade existing fossil-fuel plants 
to multi-fuel capability, including coal.
Develop a new and efficient chemistry of 
synfuel conversion of coal.
Reassign coal power plants to produce 
synfuels for transportation.
Conduct large-scale/long-term CCS tests
to find semi-permanent, monitored CO2
repositories.
 
Develop and Employ Advanced Nuclear Power:
Continue to improve the intrinsic safety 
of nuclear reactors and processing plants.
Test and construct advanced modular 
nuclear reactors near sites of existing 
plants.
Test and construct advanced burn-
er/transmuter reactors to reduce radi-
otoxic waste.
Import and develop further closed nuc-
lear fuel cycle technologies.
Develop and test proliferation-safe re-
processing methods (e.g., UREX+).
Test and develop a closed Th/U breeder 
fuel cycle.
Develop ADS systems and the required 
high current accelerator technology.
Develop the chemistry of molten salt mix-
tures, and design a molten salt test reac-
tor.
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Expand the radio-chemistry of actinides,
transactinides and fission products.
Start operating a semi-permanent nuc-
lear waste depository with a flexible 
strategy.
 
Obviously, to achieve the goals of these two 
sets of recommendations, one needs to em-
phasize much-discussed traits of a modern “ in-
formation society” with specific application to 
energy. However, this intellectual development 
would remain insufficient without revitalizing 
domestic industrial infrastructure, where it has 
been lost. To conduct such an energy upgrade 
program successfully, higher demands have to 
be made on R&D in coal and synfuel chemistry, 
in chemical engineering, in nuclear and radia-
tion-chemistry, nuclear engineering, as well as 
in low-energy basic nuclear science. To restore 
expertise lost in past decades, stronger efforts 
have to be made to increase the number of uni-
versity faculty and graduates of nuclear science 
much above the current low levels. 
University communities bare a large respon-
sibility to analyze strategic energy problems fac-
ing industrialized society and to engage in work-
ing realistic solutions. They should be made 
aware of the associated opportunities in basic 
and applied research in nuclear science and 
clean coal technology as meaningful and inter-
esting professional careers. Government agen-
cies have corresponding responsibilities:
Educate and Train Personnel
Promote and fund with priority energy 
science and technology development.
Recruit university students and faculty to 
embark on careers in basic and applied
energy science and engineering, emphas-
ize nuclear science/ technology and chem-
ical engineering.
Putting these issues into a larger reference 
frame, one realizes the true scale of the tasks. 
The eventual implementation and realization of 
the above recommendations require a strong 
and competent workforce running an upgraded
domestic manufacturing (“brick-and-mortar”) 
industry and an efficient, modern infrastruc-
ture. A sustainable energy strategy cannot be 
realized, unless the following tasks are also ac-
complished:   
Upgrade Industry and Infrastructure:
Invest in and promote domestic machin-
ing and manufacturing industry, specifi-
cally the capacity to engineer, construct 
and operate advanced modular power 
plants, generators and distribution net-
works.
Promote new and electrified public 
transport/rail systems.
Develop new electric grid and other dis-
tribution technologies. 
Develop new strategies for grid expan-
sion and install a new nationwide grid.
Develop new energy storage techniques.
Stratify the power plant regulation 
process without compromising public 
safety.
The inevitably required massive public in-
vestments (of the order of a trillion $ per dec-
ade) in an improved energy infrastructure and 
the associated gradual transformation of the 
economy can be pursued long term only with 
the consent and full cooperation of an informed 
public. Therefore, it is necessary to invest in 
public education regarding energy issues.
Inform the Domestic and International Public:
Inform the public about realistic potential 
and risk of energy technologies.
Promote reduction in energy demand, in-
crease energy efficiency.
Invest in and promote science education 
at all levels of education.
Devise a new international compact 
about the use of advanced vs. traditional 
energy technologies by countries with 
compatible technological infrastructure.
Devise a new international compact on 
the sharing and control of knowledge 
about nuclear technology, avoid monopo-
lies of knowledge, and decriminalize 
knowledge sharing between nation 
states.
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Undoubtedly, the coming decades will wit-
ness a large-scale reformation and realignment 
of Western industrialized societies. Guided by 
perceptive, courageous leaders and supported 
by an informed and concerned public, a gentle
transformation could be achieved with multiple
concurrent programs, each of a magnitude 
dwarfing the U.S. Manhattan Project. Taking on 
this historic task with courage and determina-
tion would be most effective now, when there 
is still time. The venture would also be a source 
of inspiration for generations to come.
Acknowledgments 
The author has appreciated comments and 
questions by Drs. M. Blann, D. Douglass, and D. 
Hilscher on the first draft of this article.
  
References
Aliberti, G. et al. (2004), Nucl. Sci. and Eng. 146, 
13-50.
Aliberti, G. et al. (2006), Annals of Nucl. Energy 
33, 700-733.
Allegro (2001), Allegro Energy Group Report
Andrews, J., and Jelley, N. (2007), Energy 
Science, Principles, Technologies, and Im-
pacts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Andriamonge, S. et al. (1995), Phys. Lett. B348, 
697.
APS (American Physical Society) (2007), Consol-
idated interim storage of commercial spent 
nuclear fuel. Report Panel on Public Affairs, 
Ahearn, J. and Hagengruber, R., Co-Chairs, 
February 2007.
Billings, C.E., Matson, W.R., (1972), Science 176, 
1232-1233
Bowman, C.D. et al. (1992), Nucl. Instr. Methods 
A320, 336.
Brainard, J. (2007), Chronicle of Higher Educa-
tion, April 20, A19.
Chow, T.J., Earl, J.L., (1972), 510-511
Chernousenko, V. M. (1991), Chernobyl, Insight 
from the Inside. Berlin, Heidelberg, New 
York: Springer-Verlag.
CNN (2007), Cable News Network, World Busi-
ness. June 26,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/06/26
/toshiba.nuclear.reut/
Darley, J. (2004), High noon for natural gas. 
White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea 
Green Publishing Co.
David, S., Huffer, E., and Nifenecker, H. (2007), 
Europhysics News, 38, p. 24-27
Deffeyes, K.S. 2001, Hubbert’s Peak: The im-
pending world oil shortage. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press.
Deutch, J. & Moniz, E. J. Co-Chairs et al. (2003), 
The future of nuclear power, An interdiscip-
linary MIT study.
Dey, P. K., and Bansal, N. K.,(2006). Nuclear En-
gineering and Design 236, 723-729. 
DOA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) (2007), 
Amber Waves,Vol.4, Issue 2, (April 2006 ), 
updated May 2007. 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Ma
y07SpecialIssue/Features/Ethanol.htm.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) (1999), A  
roadmap for developing accelerator trans-
mutation of waste (ATW) technology. 
DOE/RW-0519, 89 pages.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) (2000), 
The Wabash River Coal Gasification Repo-
wering Project, Topical Report 20, 28 pag-
es.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) (2002), Nuc-
lear Energy Research Advisory Committee, 
A technology roadmap for Generantion IV 
Nuclear energy systems. GIF-002-00, 91 
pages.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) (2003), Office 
of fossil fuel energy.
http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/powersy
stems/gasification/howgasificationworks.h
tml
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) (2004), Futu-
reGen, Integrated Hydrogen, Electric Power 
Production and Carbon Sequestration Re-
search Initiative. Report to Congress. 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/po
wersystems/futuregen/
futuregen_report_march_04.pdf
 38 Energy Strategy 
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) (2006), Office 
of Fossil Energy, Clean Coal Strategic Plan.
DOE-BIOM (U.S. Department of Energy, Office 
of Science) (2006), Breaking the Biological 
Barriers to Cellulosic Ethanol. Report 
DOE/SC-0095.
DOE-GIF (U.S. Department of Energy Research 
Advisory Committee and Generation IV In-
ternational Forum) (2002), A Technology 
Road Map for Generation IV Energy Sys-
tems. Report GIF-002-00, 97 pages.
 
http://www.netl.doe.gov
DOE-NERI (U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear 
Energy Research Initiative) (2006), Annual 
Report, DOE/NE-132.
DOE-NETL (U.S. Department of Energy, National 
Energy Technology Laboratory) (2005), Li-
quefied Natural Gas: Understanding the Ba-
sic Facts. Report DOE/FE-0489, 22 pages.
http://www.netl.doe.gov
Eerkens, J. W. (2006), The nuclear imperative. 
Dordrecht: Springer
EIA (2007), U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, Annual Energy Outlook 200, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/caol.html
Ewing, R.C. (2004), Geological Society of 
London 236, 7-23
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration) 
(2005), Annual Energy Outlook 2005,
http://www.eia.gov/ 
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration) 
(2006), Annual Energy Outlook 2006, and
World recoverable coal reserves,
http://www.eia.gov/coal 
EPA (2005), U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Clean Air Mercury Rule
http://www.epa.gov/air/mercuryrule/
EPA-PM2.5 (2006), U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Air Trends,
http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/pm.html
Falkowski, P., et al. (2000), Science Vol. 290, p. 
291
Fanchi, J. R. (2006), Energy in the 21st Century. 
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.
Gabbard, A. (2007), Coal Combustion: Nuclear 
Resource or Danger,
http://www.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/rev26-
43/text/colmain.html, accessed July, 2007.
GAO (2007), U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, 
February 2007,
http://www.hubbertpeak.com/US/GAO/GA
OPeakOilReport20070329.pdf
GE (2001), Smith, R.W., et al. (2001), Advanced 
Technology Combined Cycles, GE Power Sys-
tems Report GER-3936A.
Goldenbaum, F. (2004), The physics of spalla-
tion processes. Matter and Materials, Vol. 
18. Jülich: Schriften d. Forschungszentrums.
Goodell, J. (2006), Big Coal, Boston, New York: 
Houghton Mifflin.
Gore, A. (2006), An inconvenient truth. Em-
maus: Rodale. Also: many references cited .
Grisholm Little, A. (2007), Wired Magazine, 
Sept. 2007, p.110
Herbach, C.-M., Hilscher, D. et al. (2006), Nucl. 
Instr. Meth. Nucl. Res. A 562, 729
Herbst, A. M. & Hopley, G. W. (2007), Nuclear 
energy Now. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc.
Hilscher, D. and Rossner, H. (1992), Dynamics of 
nuclear fission. Ann. Phys. Fr. 17, 471
Hoffert, M. L. Caldeira, K. et al. (2002), Science
298, 981-987. 
Hofmann, H. (2007), The physics of warm nuclei 
with applications to mesoscopic systems. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press.
Krugman, P. (1996), The Self-Organizing Econo-
my. Blackwell Publishers.
IAEA (2005), International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy. Uranium 2005: Resources, Production 
and Demand.
IFEO (2004), International Fusion Energy Organ-
ization, International Thermonuclear Expe-
rimental Reactor (ITER), 
http://www.iter.org/Developfusion.htm
IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of 
Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Re-
port, Working Group III, Barker, T., et al., 
http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/docs/FAR/Approve
dSPM040Srev4b.pdf
Lewis, N. S. (2007), Science 315, pp.798-801.
Li, B. A. and Schröder, W. U. (2001), Isospin 
physics in heavy-ion collisions at interme-
diate energies. Huntington, New York: Nova 
Science Publishers.
 39Energy Strategy
Lilley, J. S. (2001), Nuclear Physics, Principles 
and Applications. Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd.
Lovelock, J. (2006), The revenge of Gaia, Earth’s 
climate crisis & the fate of humanity. New 
York: Basic Books.
MacFarland, E. (2006), La Physique au Canada, 
juillet/aout, 2006
Mainzer, K. (1997), Thinking in complexity. Ber-
lin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer Verlag.
McBride, J.P., & Moore, R.E. (1978), Science Vol. 
202, pp. 1045-1050.
Morris, C. (2006), Energy Switch, Proven Solu-
tions for a Renewable Future. Cabriola Isl-
and, Canada: New Society Publishers.
MSHA (2006), U.S. Mine Safety and Health Ad-
ministration. 
http://www.msha.gov/ACCNJ/ALLCOAL.htm
NAS (National Academy of Sciences) (2006), 
Going the distance? National Academy Press.
 
NBB (National Biodiesel Board) (2005), Re-
sponse to David Pimentel Biodiesel Life Cycle 
Analysis. 
http://eerc.ra.utk.edu/etcfc/docs/pr/Piment
elStudy-NBBDetailedResponse~July05.pdf
NETL (2002), National Energy Technology La-
boratory, Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle Power Plants,
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proce
edings/02/turbines/Izzo.pdf
NETL (2005), Technology Roadmap and Pro-
gram Plan 2005, and “Regional Carbon Se-
questration Partnerships: Phase I Accom-
plishments,”
http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/Carbon_Sequest
ration/pubs/PhaseIAccomplishment.pdf
Nifenecker, H., Meplan, O., and David, S. (2003), 
Accelerator Driven Subcritical Reactors. Bris-
tol and Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Pub-
lishing.
NMA (2007), National Mining Association, Fuel-
ing our future, http:// www.nma.org
NPC (2007), National Petroleum Council, Facing 
the hard truth about energy, Draft Report 
http:// www.npc.org/
NPR (2007), National Public Radio News (USA), 
All Things Considered, August 14. 
NWCC (U.S. National Wind Coordinating Com-
mittee) (2004),
http://www.nationalwind.org/wildlife_facts
heet.pdf
Ohlah, G. A., et al. (2006), Beyond Oil and Gas: 
The Methanol Economy, Weinheim: Wiley-
VCH Verlag GmbH, 
Pacala, S., and Socolow, R. (2004), Science 305, 
968-971
Perry, H. (1983), Science 222, 377-384
Pimentel, D., and Patzek, T. W.  (2005), Natural 
Resources Research, Vol. 14:1, 65-76. 
Probstein, R. F., and Hicks, R. E. (2006), 
Synthetic fuels. Mineola, New York: Dover 
Publications, INC.
Romm, J. J. (2005), The hype about hydrogen. 
Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press.
Rubbia, C. et al. (1993), Report CERN/AT/93-
47(ET).
Sarlux (2007), Sarlux Italy, Integrated gasifica-
tion combined cycle (IGCC) power plant. 
http://www.power-
technology.com/projects/sarlux/
Smil, V. (2005), Energy at the Crossroads, Cam-
bridge (MA), London (England): MIT Press.
Schröder, W. U. and Huizenga, J.R., (1984), 
Damped heavy-ion collisions. Treatise of 
Heavy-ion physics, Vol. 2, pp. 113-726 (D. A. 
Bromley, Edt.), New York and London: Ple-
num Press.
Schröder, W. U., Tõke, J. et al. (2003), Int.
Worksh. Multifragmentation and Rel. Top-
ics, Caen, Nov. 2003, (Agnello, Pagano, Pir-
rone, Edts.), Report GANIL/INFN 2003, p.202
Schroeder, L.S., & Lusk, E. (2006). Report of the 
Nuclear Physics and Related Computational 
Science R&D for Advanced Fuels Cycles 
Workshop, Bethesda MD, Aug. 10-12
Schweitzer, F. (2002). Modeling Complexity in 
Economic and Social Systems. Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing Co.
Sinha, R. K., and Kakodkar, A., (2006). Nuclear 
Engineering and Design 236, 683-700.
Sørensen, B. (2000), Renewable Energy: Its 
physics, engineering, environmental impacts, 
economics & planning. London, U.K.: Aca-
demic Press.
 40 Energy Strategy 
Stacey, W. M. (2001), Nuclear Reactor Physics. 
New York, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Tishchenko, V. et al. (2005), Phys. Rev. Letters 
95, 162701
Tõke, J. and Schröder, W. U. (2006), Proc. Int. 
Worksh. Multifragm.related topics, (R. Bou-
gault et al., Edt), Soc. It. Fisica, V 91, pp. 379-
385.
 
Tõke, J. and Schröder, W. U. (2003), Phys. Rev. C 
67, 034609.
WCD (2000), World Commission of Dams. Dams 
and Developments. London: Earthscan Pub-
lishers.
WHO (1999), World Health Organization, Cher-
nobyl accident.
http://www.euro.who.int/mediacentre/
